自焚者洛尕然赞 在行动前，在自家车库留下遗嘱，并在自己的脸书上发表。 Rangzen 是他自己选的名字，是藏语「独立」「 自由」之意。

纽约，2026年7月2日——长居在美国的 洛尕然赞（Lobga Rangzen）于7月2日晚在纽约联合国总部外自焚，经送医抢救无效去世。据现场视频，他在联合国总部外竖起雪山狮子旗，并开启Facebook直播，随后点燃自己。

文后附藏文全文，如果对我们的工作有任何建议，指正，请给我们发邮件📩admin@lhasaspring.org

以下为其遗嘱内容整理 (听译):

我们在国外举办任何活动，都是为了抗议中共对境内藏地的高压政策，反抗中国对藏地藏人的统治。今天，我想说几句话。 对境内藏人，要谢谢他们，我没有什么可以多说的。因为他们一直冒着生命危险，以最大的勇气，为拯救我们藏民族的语言、文化与尊严，不断努力。

因此，我没有什么资格再对他们说什么。 我今天主要是想对流亡藏人说四点：

第一，流亡藏人不能忘记自己的责任。 我们在流亡当中，享受着自由民主的生活。这样的自由民主，是尊者达赖喇嘛给予我们的。尊者让我们拥有自由，并不是要让我们自己内耗，也不是要让我们用民主自由之名，在内部彼此斗争。 我们每一个人都应该为图伯特的自由发声，为图伯特的未来想办法。尊者达赖喇嘛曾经说过，生活在国外的藏人，不要因为自己有了房子、有了车子，就感到满足，因为图伯特境内的藏人仍然生活在苦难之中。

第二，我们要明白，藏人的苦难，是因为我们失去了自己的国家。 尊者达赖喇嘛是世界的和平导师，他为所有众生的和平与幸福奔波，所以他不会把话说得太多、太重。但是我们自己要明白：为什么图伯特境内的藏人没有任何自由？为什么我们的民族面临被消灭的危机？为什么我们连供奉尊者达赖喇嘛法相的权利都没有？这都是因为我们失去了自己的国家，失去了自己的自由。很多人说我们没有国家。不是的，我们有国家；只是我们的国家被中国占领了。

第三，流亡藏人不要再分地域、教派，而要真正团结起来。 中共打压藏人时，并不会区分你是康巴人、安多人，还是卫藏人；也不会区分你属于哪一个教派。他们同样打压所有藏人，也同样破坏所有宗教。所以，我们在外的藏人，真的不应该再分什么康巴、安多、卫藏，也不应该再分各个教派。我们每一个人都应该团结起来，为恢复藏人的自由、为藏民族的独立，做出更多努力。

第四，不要因为我的行动而停止应该去做的事；真正的哀悼，是继续为图伯特奋斗。 如果这一次我要做一个大的行动、一个引起轰动的行动，我双手合十请求大家：不要因为这件事，而停止我们现在正在做的事情。我们现在做的，是为了保存自己的语言与文化。所以，该跳舞的还是要跳舞，该唱歌的还是要唱歌。因为这些都是为了让年轻一代的藏人，能够接受并传承自己的语言与文化。 特别是现在，我们即将迎来尊者达赖喇嘛九十一岁华诞。我希望全球各地的藏人，都要盛大举办尊者的祝寿活动。这些都非常重要。我们不要因为一个人的行动，就只停留在悲哀或默哀之中。

我们真正需要悲哀、需要默哀的，是我们失去了自己的国家。我们每一个人都应该为此发起更大的行动。 我今天要做这个行动，不是因为我缺乏衣食住行，不是因为我没有吃的、没有穿的、没有住的，也不是为了我个人的生活问题。这一切，是为了图伯特的独立，为了图伯特的抗争。 因此，我双手合十请求大家：如果你们真的要哀悼我，请按照我在这里所说的愿望去做。希望每一个人都为图伯特的事情继续努力，继续奋斗。最后，我想说：图伯特民族的独立万岁！博嘉洛！ （图伯特必胜 ！！！！）

2026年7月2号

Before carrying out his self-immolation, Lobga Rangzen left this final testament in his garage and also published it on his Facebook page. Rangzen is the name he chose for himself. In Tibetan, it means "independence" or "freedom."

The following is a translated transcript of his final message:
If you have any suggestions, email us at admin@lhasaspring.org

Whenever we organize activities abroad, we do so to protest the Chinese Communist Party's repressive policies in Tibet and to resist China's rule over the Tibetan people. Today, I would like to say a few words.

To Tibetans inside Tibet, I have little to say. Thank you all! They have continued to risk their lives with extraordinary courage, doing everything they can to preserve Tibet's language, culture, and dignity. Because of that, I do not feel I have the standing to tell them what they should do.

Today, I want to speak mainly to Tibetans living in exile. I have four messages.

1. Tibetans in exile must not forget their responsibility.

We live in exile, enjoying freedom and democracy. This freedom and democracy were made possible by His Holiness the Dalai Lama. His Holiness did not give us freedom so that we could fight among ourselves, nor so that we could use democracy and freedom as excuses for internal division. Every one of us should speak out for Tibet's freedom and work for Tibet's future.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama once said that Tibetans living abroad should not become content simply because they have a house, a car, or a comfortable life, while Tibetans inside Tibet continue to live under suffering.

2. We must understand that the suffering of the Tibetan people exists because we have lost our country.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama is a global teacher of peace. He dedicates himself to the peace and well-being of all beings, and therefore does not often speak in harsh or confrontational terms. But we ourselves must understand:

Why do Tibetans inside Tibet have no freedom?

Why does our nation face the danger of destruction?

Why are we denied even the right to display an image of His Holiness the Dalai Lama?

The answer is the same: because we have lost our country, and with it our freedom.

Many people say that we do not have a country. That is not true. We do have a country—it has simply been occupied by China.

3. Tibetans in exile must stop dividing themselves by region or religious tradition and unite as one people.

When the Chinese Communist Party represses Tibetans, it does not distinguish between Kham, Amdo, or Ü-Tsang. Nor does it distinguish between different Buddhist schools.

It suppresses all Tibetans and seeks to destroy all Tibetan religious traditions alike.

Therefore, those of us living in exile should no longer divide ourselves into Kham, Amdo, or Ü-Tsang, nor separate ourselves by sectarian affiliation. We must stand together and work harder to restore Tibetan freedom and secure Tibet's independence.

4. Do not let my action stop the work that must continue. The truest way to mourn me is to continue struggling for Tibet.

If today I undertake a major action—one that draws the world's attention—I join my hands in prayer and ask you this:

Please do not stop doing the work we are doing now because of what I have done. Everything we are doing today is for the preservation of our language and culture. Those who dance should continue to dance. Those who sing should continue to sing.

These things are essential so that the younger generation of Tibetans can inherit and carry forward our language and culture.

Especially now, as we prepare to celebrate the 91st birthday of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, I hope Tibetans everywhere will organize grand celebrations in his honor. These things are profoundly important.

Do not allow the action of one individual to leave you only with grief or silent mourning. What we should truly mourn is that we have lost our country. And each one of us should respond by taking even greater action.

I am taking this action today not because I lack food, clothing, or shelter, nor because I face personal hardships or problems in my own life. Everything I do is for Tibet's independence and for Tibet's struggle.

Therefore, with my hands folded in prayer, I ask you:

If you truly wish to mourn me, then fulfill the wishes I have expressed here. May everyone of you continue working and struggling for Tibet.

Finally, I want to say:

Long live the independence of the Tibetan nation!

Bhod Gyalo! Victory to Tibet!

July 2nd,2026

Georgetown University 2026 Feb 4th · Event Transcript

Participants: Moderator Dechen Atsatsang · Prof. Mark Giordano · Ambassador Donald Lu· Sikyong Penpa Tsring

【Moderator】 Dechen Atsatsang(Senior, Georgetown School of Foreign Service; Georgetown Human Rights Society)

Good evening, everyone, and thank you so much for coming. My name is Dechen Atsatsang, and I am a senior at Georgetown School of Foreign Service studying international politics, justice, and peace studies, on behalf of Georgetown for Human Rights.

I am really grateful to have you join us for tonight’s conversation on the geopolitical significance of Tibet. Despite Tibet’s central role in regional geopolitics — encompassing questions of environment, security, governance, and human rights — Tibet often remains under-explored in academic and policy spaces. We hope tonight’s discussion offers a meaningful opportunity to engage deeply with those issues, especially here on campus at Georgetown.

It is an honor to have Sikyong Penpa Tsring with us. I am especially thankful to Professor Mark Giordano and Ambassador Donald Lu for being here as well.

Sikyong Penpa Tsring is the President of the Central Tibetan Administration and has dedicated his life to fighting for the rights of the Tibetan people and safeguarding Tibet's culture. As a civil society leader and politician, Sikyong earned his Bachelor of Arts degree from Madras Christian College and served four consecutive terms in the Tibetan Parliament in Exile, serving as Speaker for two of those terms. He also served as Executive Director of the Tibetan Parliamentary and Policy Research Center, and as the representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama at the Office of Tibet in Washington, D.C.

Since his election as the second democratically elected Sikyong of the Central Tibetan Administration in 2021, he has worked to strengthen the CTA’s governance, advocated for the Tibetan people in meetings with world leaders, raised concerns about the Chinese Communist Party’s policies restricting Tibetan rights and culture, worked tirelessly to secure the release of Tibetan political prisoners, and pursued dialogue with the Chinese government.

I will now turn it over to Professor Mark Giordano for opening remarks. Thank you.

【Opening Remarks】 Prof. Mark Giordano (Georgetown University)

I was asked to come here and give some remarks — to put the Tibetan Plateau in the context of the “Map of the Modern World,” a class many of you are familiar with, because I see many friends out here.

The first thing I want to say is that around the time I arrived at Georgetown, His Holiness the Dalai Lama came to Washington, D.C., and I saw him on stage with Georgetown graduate Nancy Pelosi and Richard Gere. So twelve years later, I think this is another meaningful connection — and we are grateful you are here tonight.

What I want to say about the plateau is well illustrated in this image. On a political map, we look at borders, but we also ask: what crosses those borders invisibly? The Tibetan Plateau is a perfect example. I will frame it in two ways.

The first is water. The Yangtze, the Yellow River, the Red River, the Mekong, the Irrawaddy, the Brahmaputra, the Ganges, and the Indus — all originate on the plateau. They rise very close to one another, then spread across the continent, supplying drinking water and food for roughly a quarter of the world’s population.

The Tibetan Plateau is the source of Asia’s ten major river systems, sustaining nearly a quarter of humanity.

In the same way, Tibetan ideas and culture are found far beyond the plateau itself. My first interaction with Tibetans was in Yunnan, China, in 1989 — Yunnan is not “Tibet” on any map, but lamas were there. Later in Qinghai (also not called Tibet), lamas again. In Sikkim, India, in what China calls southern Tibet and India calls Arunachal Pradesh, and in Mongolia. At the Smithsonian Asian Art Museum, there is a whole Tibetan room you can experience for yourself.

So we look at what lies within the borders on a political map, but we must also consider how resources, ideas, and spirituality flow across those boundaries. With that, I turn it over to Ambassador Lu for a more formal introduction. Thank you.

【Formal Introduction】 Ambassador Donald Lu (Former U.S. State Department)

Your Excellency Sikyong Penpa Tsring, Professor Giordano, dear friends and colleagues. As I was preparing for this evening, I read the Sikyong’s biography carefully — and I found some remarkable things. For one, you and I graduated from college in the same year. Mr. Sikyong, let me just say: you look young and vibrant. (Sikyong: “I dyed my hair.”)

His journey actually shares remarkable similarities with all of yours. As a young college student in the 1980s, Penpa Tsring was studying in what was then called Madras — now Chennai, in southern India, which is very warm, much like this classroom. But at that time, there was terrible repression in Tibet. Monks and nuns were leading demonstrations to express concern about the influx of Han Chinese and the tightening grip of Beijing.

That young student joined the Tibetan freedom movement and used his voice to speak out for the Tibetan people — much like all of you have gathered here tonight, to learn about and to stand up for those whose rights are threatened.

That led him to work with NGOs — many of you intern with or have worked with NGOs. Then, to think tanks — some of you have done think-tank work. And ultimately to the Tibetan Parliament in Exile.

Ten years ago, Penpa Tsring came to Washington as His Holiness’s representative to North America. He became a Washingtonian too — someone who has learned to love this city.

I retired a few months ago from the State Department after working on Tibetan issues for more than thirty years. One thing that always struck me is how bipartisan U.S. support for Tibet is — for the Tibetan people, the Central Tibetan Administration, and His Holiness. And what we are seeing right now is that President Trump is continuing that long-standing bipartisan tradition.

In July 2020, President Trump wrote a historic letter to His Holiness, congratulating him on his 85th birthday and inviting him to the White House. That same year, Sikyong Lobsang Sangay made the first-ever Sikyong visit to the White House. In December 2020, President Trump signed the historic Tibetan Policy and Support Act, which requires the U.S. government to recognize only the Tibetan Buddhist community’s decision on the selection of Buddhist leaders, including the next Dalai Lama; mandates sanctions against Chinese officials who interfere; and formally recognizes the CTA and Sikyong as the legitimate representatives of the Tibetan diaspora.

We are so fortunate today to hear from someone who has fought his whole life for the dignity and universal human rights of the Tibetan people — someone whose journey began, like yours, as a college student standing up for human rights. Please join me in welcoming Sikyong Penpa Tsring.

【Main Address】 Sikyong Penpa Tsring (President, Central Tibetan Administration)

It’s good to see Donald again. He served as Assistant Secretary of State covering Nepal and Tibetan issues. Around two years ago, the Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, Azra Zehra, together with Donald and Ambassador Eric Garcetti, met His Holiness in Delhi, and we had a very productive conversation following up on that.

Thank you, Professor Mark — I have been asking him to serve as a consultant on water issues. We have a shortage of human and financial resources, so we need experts like Mark, and today we have found one more resource here at Georgetown.

Let me begin with some good news. We have been working with the U.S. Congress for a long time. I always say: we are bearing the fruit of His Holiness’s labor. The recent appropriations bill was passed, though there was a scare when all foreign assistance, including the Tibet Fund, was cut last year. Working closely with the State Department and Congress, we secured bipartisan, bicameral support. The new appropriation allocates approximately $13 million for the Tibetan people.

Two days ago we learned that a Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues has been appointed — Riley Barnes — even though it was not publicly announced. The State Department also confirmed the Tibetan New Year event, with the invitation going out from Barnes in his capacity as Special Coordinator. Another piece of good news: His Holiness will win a Grammy Award. It is a surprise to everyone — His Holiness does not sing and is not especially into music — but he has won. And there is a powerful film, The Wisdom of Happiness, based on interviews with His Holiness, which Richard Gere is currently promoting worldwide.

In the new appropriations language, it states that for the purposes of the act the Central Tibetan Administration will be considered the Tibetan Government in Exile. This is a step forward in our U.S. advocacy, and we are working with members of Congress to advance legislation that would formalize the CTA’s legitimacy — and potentially recognize the Tibetan Government in Exile.

Tibet: Geography and Geopolitics

Our position is clear: Tibet has been an independent nation for centuries — until Communist China invaded in 1950. It has been almost seventy-five years since China occupied Tibet, and almost 66 years since we came into exile.

To understand Tibetan history, you must understand Tibetan geography. The Tibetan Plateau is the highest and largest plateau on Earth. It emerged fifty million years ago from the collision of the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates. Geologists say the Himalayas are still rising by ten millimeters every year, which is also why the entire region is a seismic zone.

We call ourselves “the land surrounded by snow mountain ranges” — the Himalayas to the south, the Karakoram to the west, the Kunlun and Tanggula ranges to the north. Tibet’s average elevation is approximately 4,800 meters (15,748 ft). Early Western explorers called it “the Roof of the World.”

In the Heavenly Abode, the land surrounded by snow mountain ranges.

Chinese environmental scientists today call Tibet the “Third Pole” because it holds the world’s largest reserves of glaciers and permafrost outside the Arctic and Antarctic. These feed all of Asia’s major river systems, which is why Tibet is also called “the Water Tower of Asia.”

China’s Yellow River and Yangtze are the lifelines of its population of 1.4 billion. Without them, China cannot feed its people. The Mekong flows into five Southeast Asian nations; the Salween and Irrawaddy into Myanmar; the Brahmaputra into India and Bangladesh.

China is now building a mega-dam at the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra/Yarlung Tsangpo — a project that will generate 2.8 times the hydroelectricity of the Three Gorges Dam. India has called it a potential “water bomb.” The entire region is seismically active; a dam failure would be catastrophic downstream.

Water Tower of Asia — source of ten major river systems serving the most densely populated nations on Earth.

China does not share hydrological data with any downstream country. We are talking about at least 193 hydropower projects on Tibetan rivers inside Tibet, before the water crosses into any other country, yet all that electricity is transferred to eastern China to power industry, not to serve the Tibetan people.

Formed 50 million years ago by the collision of the Indian Plate and the Eurasian Plate, it continues to rise by 10 millimeters annually.

Because Tibet has always been an independent buffer between China and India, there was historically never a common border — and never a war — between the two. Only after China occupied Tibet in 1950 did the first India-China war occur in 1962. India still officially calls the boundary the “Indo-Tibetan Border” and maintains an Indo-Tibetan Border Police — a reflection of India’s principled position.

History: Tibet, Mongolia, and China

Tibet has a widely accepted history of approximately 2,200 years — though human habitation on the plateau dates back more than 100,000 years. Between the 7th and 9th centuries, Tibet was a great empire in Central Asia, at its height capturing the Tang capital and reaching as far as present-day Samarkand in Uzbekistan. After about 400 years of fragmentation, new powers emerged.

In the 7th century, we invented the Tibetan script, derived from Indian Devanagari, entirely distinct from Chinese. When Indian Buddhist masters came to Tibet, they encouraged Tibetans to transliterate the entire Buddhist canon into their own language. Over 500 years, from the 8th to the 13th century, before Buddhism nearly vanished from India, Tibetans translated every available Sanskrit and Pali text. Today, if you want to study Buddhism in its totality, Tibetan is the only language in the world that contains the complete canon. Last December 14th, we presented 223 volumes of a Tibetan-to-Tibetan dictionary to the Library of Congress.

In the 13th century, Tibet developed its unique “priest-patron” relationship with the Mongols — not as subjects, but as spiritual teachers. The Mongols became Buddhists; today, all Mongolians are Buddhists. A few decades later Kublai Khan invaded China in 1271. Our relationship was always with the Mongols — not the Chinese emperors. The Mongols ruled China from 1271 to 1368; when the Ming (the first Han Chinese dynasty) expelled them, Tibet had its own line of rulers — the Sakya Lamas, the Phagmodrupa, and eventually the 5th Dalai Lama, who took over temporal and spiritual leadership in 1642.

During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) there was very little political relationship between Tibet and China — only occasional exchanges of lamas and titles. The Ming were, in turn, overthrown not by Han Chinese but by the Manchus (the Qing dynasty). Manchu influence in Tibet grew in the 18th century, primarily to help Tibetans resist Nepalese incursions — not to occupy Tibet.

After the fall of the Qing dynasty, Chinese nationalists came to power and incorporated the claim that Tibet is part of China into the modern nationalist narrative. The Chinese Communist Party later inherited and continued this narrative, giving rise to the familiar slogan that Tibet has been an inseparable part of China since ancient times. Yet the Chinese government itself has never clearly defined what exactly “since ancient times” is supposed to mean.

The reason I came here today is to introduce a new book written by a Chinese professor. As a university student, he was taught that Tibet had been part of China since ancient times. Later, however, he noticed that the Chinese government consistently asks foreign governments to recognize Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China. That made him wonder: if Tibet has always been part of China, why would such recognition still be necessary?

This question led him to conduct a detailed historical investigation. He examined official Chinese historical records from the Ming and Qing dynasties, relying exclusively on Chinese government publications printed before 1949. His conclusion is straightforward: he found no historical evidence supporting the claim that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times. The Chinese edition of his book was published in 2019, and to this day the Chinese government has not produced a substantive response to his findings.

The Middle Way Policy and Current Engagement

From 1959 to around 1973 we pursued independence; not a single government supported us. His Holiness then proposed the Middle Way — a Buddhist concept (Madhyamaka) of avoiding extremes. His Holiness’s elder brother met Deng Xiaoping in 1979; Deng said, “We can discuss anything except independence.” We took that as an opening and sent fact-finding delegations to Tibet in the early 1980s. A window of dialogue briefly opened under Hu Yaobang, then closed.

In 1987, His Holiness put forward the Five-Point Peace Proposal: transform Tibet into a zone of peace; end the transfer of Han Chinese into Tibet; respect fundamental rights and democratic freedoms; restore and protect Tibet’s natural environment; begin earnest negotiations on the future of Tibet. No positive response came from China.

His Holiness then consulted the Tibetan people. The overwhelming public opinion — and the unanimous vote of the Tibetan Parliament in Exile — was: whatever His Holiness decides, we will abide by it. His Holiness reiterated the Middle Way: a non-violent, negotiated solution mutually beneficial to both Tibetans and Chinese.

From 2002 to 2010, there were nine rounds of talks between Tibetan envoys and Chinese officials. Ultimately, China used these primarily to ensure no disruption during the 2008 Olympics. Dialogue has been frozen since 2010. During my term, there have been back-channel contacts, but nothing substantive — particularly given Xi Jinping’s approach.

In July 2024, President Biden signed the Resolve Tibet Act, which states the Tibet dispute has yet to be resolved; calls for resolution under international law; affirms the Tibetan people’s right to self-determination; and — most significantly — formally states that the United States does not accept China’s false historical narrative that Tibet has been part of China “since antiquity.” This is the first time a government has officially pushed back on that claim.

Now let me turn to the question of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation. The Chinese government is actually less concerned with the current Dalai Lama than with his successor. They understand that if they can control the Fifteenth Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, they believe they can also control the devotion and loyalty of Tibetan Buddhists. In many ways, they are waiting for the present Dalai Lama to pass away.

In 2007, the Chinese government issued what is known as State Religious Affairs Bureau Order No. 5, which claims that the Chinese state has the final authority to approve the reincarnations of Tibetan Buddhist lamas.

His Holiness’s response has been remarkably clear. He has said, “I will be reborn in a free world. If, by that time, Tibet and China are still not free, the Dalai Lama will not be reborn there.”

The Chinese government’s second argument is that, according to tradition, the selection of reincarnate lamas should be determined through the Golden Urn ceremony. In fact, the Golden Urn was introduced only in 1793 by the Qing court, following the Nepal–Tibet War. As part of the 29 Article Ordinance for the More Effective Governing of Tibet, the Qianlong Emperor required that the Golden Urn be used in recognizing the reincarnations of the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, and other high lamas. However, the first 8 Dalai Lamas had all been recognized through longstanding Tibetan religious traditions, without any involvement from the Chinese state.

The most well-known misuse of the Golden Urn came in the recognition of the Eleventh Panchen Lama. In 1995, His Holiness recognized a six-year-old Tibetan boy as the Panchen Lama. Shortly afterward, the Chinese government detained the child, his family, and members of the search committee. To this day, no independent observer knows where they are or even whether the Panchen Lama is still alive. He would now be about thirty-six or thirty-seven years old.

The Chinese authorities then organized their own selection process, claiming to use the Golden Urn. According to eyewitness accounts, the drawing itself was manipulated by physically altering the lots to predetermine the outcome. One of the witnesses was the senior Tibetan lama Arjia Rinpoche, who later described the process in his memoir. He now lives in the Washington, D.C. area. In other words, the Chinese government appropriated the concept of the Golden Urn while fundamentally undermining its legitimacy.

Finally, there is an obvious contradiction. The Chinese Communist Party is officially atheist and does not profess belief in any religion. His Holiness has responded with characteristic wit: if the Chinese government truly wishes to oversee reincarnations, it should first study Tibetan Buddhism and understand what reincarnation actually means. The institution of reincarnate lamas is a uniquely Tibetan Buddhist tradition with a history of more than nine centuries, dating back to the First Dalai Lama. Perhaps, he joked, the government should first identify the reincarnations of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping—and now even Jiang Zemin—before concerning itself with that of the Dalai Lama.

There is an additional irony. The Chinese government has long required Tibetan monasteries to display portraits of successive Chinese leaders—from Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin and Xi Jinping—with their names even rendered in Tibetan script. In that sense, one might say the government has cultivated its own form of political personality worship while claiming authority over a religious tradition in which it does not itself profess belief.

We are working in the United States and across the free world. Tibet is genuinely bipartisan in Washington — when Republicans and Democrats cannot agree on anything else, they stand together on Tibet. We do the same in Canada, in India (All-Party Parliamentary Group for Tibet), and everywhere we operate. We will keep doing this work — and keep reaching the next generation, which is why evenings like tonight matter so much to us.

I also want to thank Ambassador Donald Lu. For nearly three decades, he has worked on Tibet-related issues with remarkable personal commitment, and he has been a close partner of ours throughout that time. The current Representative of the Tibet Office previously spoke here at Georgetown at Ambassador Lu’s invitation. Thank you for your time and attention. I apologize — I can speak for hours.

Questions & Answers

【Moderator】

Tibet is an emotional topic in many parts of the world, including the United States. A reminder: let’s be respectful to one another and to our guest.

【Question 1】

I thought it was interesting that you mentioned narratives. One common Chinese narrative is that China invaded Tibet to liberate the Tibetan people from serfdom. What is your take on that?

【Sikyong Penpa Tsring】

China always uses nice words to cover up its misdeeds. They say they “liberated” Tibet — from whom? They invoke slavery, serfdom, servitude. Professor Lao, who researched this extensively in Chinese historical documents, found no record of a slave system in Tibet — but did find records of slave systems in Manchuria and Mongolia.

When China says Tibet was a slave system, they make it sound like medieval Europe. That is not the case. We did have a system of estate owners and associated farmers — a form of serfdom — but no worse than in medieval Europe, and considerably better than in contemporary China of the same period.

“Liberation” is simply another name for “occupation” when used by the Chinese government. We never asked China to liberate us. It was not their job. That is the narrative China tries to impose on the world — that they freed Tibet from slavery. It is not the truth.

【Question 2】

Given Tibet's strategic importance to China, it seems very unlikely that the PRC will relinquish control. What is a realistic vision for your approach?

【Sikyong Penpa Tsring】

That is precisely why His Holiness is asking for the Middle Way — not independence. If Tibet remains part of China, China will have to reach an agreement with us on how we use our natural resources. His Holiness is not seeking independence — that must be made clear to the Chinese people.

The Chinese government keeps calling His Holiness a “separatist,” but he is not asking for independence. And Beijing has not made that clear to ordinary Chinese citizens — otherwise, the 250 to 300 million Chinese Buddhists would offer much more support for the Tibetan people. Many Chinese come to Tibet as tourists to learn about Tibetan Buddhism; they live in a spiritual vacuum and look to Tibet for guidance.

We are proposing a mutually beneficial solution: Tibet can benefit from China’s economic development, and China can benefit spiritually from Tibetan civilization. Environmental protection in Tibet is critical even for Chinese people. We are on the same page on substance — it is only the Chinese leadership that lacks the wisdom to resolve this.

【Question 3】

Have you ever disagreed with His Holiness, and how have you navigated that?

【Sikyong Penpa Tsring】

Yes, there are Tibetans who disagree with His Holiness — quite a number of young Tibetans seek complete independence. I understand completely: when I was younger, I too sought Tibetan independence. But once you understand global politics, geopolitics, and our constraints, the calculus shifts.

Every time His Holiness says something, he has thought it through many times. We, too, must think carefully, analyze, and then agree or disagree. I tend to agree with His Holiness because he is the most reasonable person in the world. He is always looking for peace and happiness for everyone, not just for Tibetans.

【Follow-up Question】

Do you think the Chinese are afraid that, once His Holiness passes, the idea of the Middle Way may pass with him, and younger Tibetans will push for independence instead?

【Sikyong Penpa Tsring】

We hope His Holiness lives for a very long time. But that concern is exactly why our current strategy focuses on Tibetan history — to reopen doors and windows that have been closed. You never know what can shift.

One of our planned initiatives is to study different scenarios for China — with external forces and under various political conditions — and, under each scenario, assess the challenges and opportunities for Tibetans and Tibet. These are the things we will keep doing, unless and until some common sense enters the Chinese leadership.

Compiled and Edited by GD; Translated by Wilson

Special thanks to Hoyas for Human Rights (Georgetown University), the Office of Tibet in DC, and everyone who made this event possible!

【主持人】德钦·阿桑仓（乔治城大学外交学院学生，代表乔治城大学人权协会）

大家晚上好，非常感谢你们的到来。我叫德钦·阿桑仓，我是乔治城大学外交学院的大四学生，研究国际政治以及正义与和平研究，代表乔治城大学人权协会。

我非常荣幸能够欢迎大家来到今晚的谈话——《图伯特藏地的地缘政治意义》。尽管藏地在地区地缘政治中扮演着核心角色，涉及环境、安全、治理以及人权问题，藏地却经常在学术和政策领域被探索不足。我们希望今晚的讨论能够提供一个有意义的参与机会，尤其是在乔治城大学的校园里，深度探讨这些问题。

今晚我们非常荣幸地请到了司政边巴次仁与我们一起。我要特别感谢Mark Giordan教授和 Donald Lu大使的出席。

司政边巴次仁是藏人行政中央行政长官，毕生致力于为藏人的权利和文化而奋斗。作为公民社会领袖和政治家，他在马德拉斯基督教学院获得文学学士学位，是连续四届藏人流亡议会的议员，并担任其中两个任期的发言人。他还担任过藏人流亡议会和政策研究中心的执行主任，以及尊者达赖喇嘛驻华盛顿特区西藏办事处的代表。自他当选为第二位民选藏人行政中央司政以来，他致力于加强藏人行政中央的管理，在与世界领导人的会晤中为藏人发声，并引起全球对中国共产党限制藏人权利和文化政策的关注和担忧。他还不知疲倦地努力确保藏人政治犯的释放，并寻求与中国政府的对话。

现在请Mark Giordano教授做开场白，谢谢。

【开场发言】Mark Giordano教授（乔治城大学）

我应邀来这里做开场白。我会将青藏高原放在《现代世界地图》课程的视角下——这是你们很多人都熟悉的课程——发表一些评论，因为我在这里看到了很多朋友。

我想说的第一件事是，当我刚到乔治城大学的时候，尊者达赖喇嘛来到华盛顿特区，我看到他和乔治城大学毕业的南希·佩洛西，以及另一位嘉宾理查德·基尔同台。所以12年后，我认为这是另一个美好的联系。我们非常感激您今晚的到来。

我想谈谈高原的事。这张图可以很好地说明：在现代世界地图上，我们看边界，我们也观察事物交叉的地方——有些边界你从地图上看不到。我认为青藏高原就是一个很好的例子。

我将用两个框架来诠释它。第一个是水。长江、黄河、红河、湄公河、伊洛瓦底江、雅鲁藏布江、恒河、印度河——这些大河都起源于高原。它们在那里彼此非常接近，然后蔓延遍布亚洲。青藏高原是世界上四分之一人口的饮用水和食物来源地。

青藏高原是亚洲十大河流的发源地，滋养四分之一世界人口

但同样的道理也适用于精神层面——藏地的思想往往不只在高原上被发现，而是在其他地方。我第一次和藏人互动是1989年在云南，那时地图上的云南不是藏地，但那里有喇嘛。后来我在中国青海，那里也见到喇嘛；在印度的锡金有藏传佛教；在蒙古也有藏地元素。史密森尼亚洲艺术博物馆里还有一个藏地主题展室，大家可以自己去体验。

我们在政治地图上观察边界内的事物，但你也会思考：资源是如何传播的？思想和精神是如何传播的？

现在，我们有请Donald Lu大使给我们做一个更正式的介绍。谢谢。

【正式介绍】Donald Lu大使（前美国国务院外交官）

尊敬的司政边巴次仁、Giordano教授，亲爱的朋友和同事们：

当我为今晚做准备的时候，我读了司政的传记。虽然之前有幸几次见到您，但这是我第一次仔细阅读您的传记，我发现了一些有趣的事情：您和我是同年大学毕业的。司政先生，我只能说您看起来真的年轻有活力。（司政笑答：我染了头发。）

他的经历和你们在座的年轻人有一些惊人的相似之处，让我解释一下。作为80年代的年轻大学生，边巴次仁在当时被称为马德拉斯（今钦奈 Chennai）的地方上学，那里在印度南部，非常温暖，就像今天这个教室一样。但那个时候，藏地正在发生非常可怕的镇压——有许多由僧侣和尼姑领导的示威游行，表达他们对大量汉族移民进入藏地的担忧，以及对北京日益加强的政治控制的不满。

当时这个年轻的学生加入了西藏自由运动，用他的声音为被镇压的藏人发声——就像你们今晚聚集在这里一样，试图了解并为那些受到威胁的人们发声，同时也为保护人权而发声。

这使得他后来在多个非政府组织工作——你们中很多人都在非政府组织实习和工作过。边巴次仁接着在智囊团工作，最后来到了流亡政府的藏人流亡议会。10年前，边巴次仁来到华盛顿，作为尊者派驻北美的代表，他既是藏人，也成为了华盛顿人，他学会了热爱这座城市。

我几个月前从国务院退休，有幸在西藏问题上工作了超过30年。有一件事一直让我印象深刻：美国两党都全力支持藏人行政中央以及尊者达赖喇嘛。我们现在看到的是，特朗普总统将继续坚持这一基于两党传统的长期立场。

举几个例子：2020年7月，特朗普总统给尊者达赖喇嘛写了一封具有历史性意义的信，祝贺他85岁生日并邀请他访问白宫；同年，边巴次仁的前任司政洛桑森格首次以司政身份到访白宫；2020年12月，特朗普总统签署了历史性的《西藏政策和支持法案》——该法案要求美国政府只承认由藏传佛教团体决定的宗教领袖选择，包括下一任达赖喇嘛，并授权对干涉该过程的中国官员实施制裁，正式承认藏人行政中央及司政为藏人侨民的合法代表。

今天我们非常荣幸能听到他的演讲。他的旅程开始于大学时代捍卫人权的活动，就像你们今晚聚集在这里一样。请和我一起欢迎司政边巴次仁讲话。

【主讲演讲】司政边巴次仁（藏人行政中央行政长官）

很高兴再次见到唐纳德。他曾是国务院的助理国务卿，负责尼泊尔和西藏问题。大约两年前，我们和西藏问题特别协调员阿兹拉·泽赫拉、唐纳德，以及埃里克·加西提大使在德里会见了尊者达赖喇嘛，进行了一次重要的谈话。

感谢Mark教授，我请他做我们藏人关于水问题的顾问。我们有很多人力和财政资源的短缺，所以我们需要像Mark这样的专家来帮助我们。所以我们在乔治城大学又发现了一个新的资源。

首先分享一些好消息。我们已经和美国国会合作很久了，我总是说我们正在收获尊者辛勤劳动所结出的果实。尊者工作了这么多年，现在我们继承他的事业并发扬光大。在过去的几天里，拨款法案已经通过，尽管期间有一些惊心动魄的时刻——去年所有的外国援助都被削减，西藏基金也被削减。在过去一年里，我们与国务院和议会密切合作，正如唐纳德所说，我们有两党两院的共同支持。新拨款中约有1300万将用于藏人。

我们前天注意到西藏问题特别协调员已被任命，即使没有公开宣布——国务院组织了西藏新年庆祝活动，邀请来自莱利·巴恩斯，他就是被任命的西藏问题特别协调员，我们认为他从三天前开始正式履职。

还有一个好消息：尊者将赢得格莱美奖。这对大家来说是个惊喜，因为尊者不唱歌，也不特别关注音乐——但他赢得了格莱美奖！此外还有一部电影《幸福的智慧》，是根据对尊者的采访制作的，现在理查德·基尔正在四处宣传这部电影，它已经在一些国家商业发行。

在新的拨款法案中，有一个新的说法，大意是：为了法案的目的，藏人行政中央将被视为西藏流亡政府。这是我们在美国倡导工作中向前迈出的一步。我们正在与众多议员沟通，看看是否可以对此立法，以确定藏人行政中央的合法性，并很可能正式承认西藏流亡政府。

藏地的历史与地源政治

几个世纪以来，藏地一直是一个独立的国家，直到1950年共产主义中国入侵藏地。中国占领藏地已经快75年了，我们被迫流亡也已经快66年了。

藏地在1950年10月被中国强行占领，到了1951年，我们被迫签署所谓的十七点协议。在此协议下，尊者达赖喇嘛试图在藏地再多待几年，然而中国践踏了协议的所有约定。1959年，达赖喇嘛及8万5千名追随者先后逃往印度。在流亡的一年后，1960年，尊者在非常困难的情况下引入了民主。

要了解藏地历史，你也必须先了解藏地地理。藏地高原是地球上最高、最大的高原，从地层构造的转换中出现，位于印度板块与欧亚板块之间。藏地出现于5000万年前，地质学家说藏地喜马拉雅山每年增长10毫米，因为地层构造的变化仍在持续，这也是为什么整个地区都是地震带。

全藏地理全貌：南有喜马拉雅山，西有喀喇昆仑山，北有昆仑山（CTA DIIR 1992）

我们称自己为被绵延雪山包围的土地——南部有喜马拉雅山，西部有喀喇昆仑山，北边有昆仑山和唐古拉山。藏地的平均海拔约4800米，被称为世界屋脊。今天中国环境科学家称藏地为第三极，因为藏地拥有世界最多的冰川和永冻层，滋养了亚洲所有的主要河流，所以藏地也被称为亚洲的水塔。

天堂居所：被绵延雪山环绕的土地

中国的黄河和长江是进入中国的主要河流生命线，如果没有这两条河流，中国将无法养活14亿人口。还有湄公河进入东南亚五国，萨尔温江和伊洛瓦底江流入缅甸，雅鲁藏布江在印度称为布拉马普特拉河。中国正在布拉马普特拉河大拐弯处建设一个超级巨型水坝，其发电量将是三峡大坝的2.8倍。这将摧毁那个地区独特的文化以及动植物群，已成为中印之间重大的地缘政治问题。

亚洲水塔：发源于藏地的各大河流及其流经国家

青藏高原地质形成：
5000万年前由印度板块与欧亚板块碰撞形成，每年仍上升10毫米

藏地一直是中印之间的缓冲带，历史上从未有过印度和中国的共同边界，也从未有过印度和中国之间的战争——直到1950年中国占领藏地之后，印度和中国才在1962年爆发了第一次战争。印度政府至今仍称其为印藏边境而非中印边境，印藏边防警察的名称也没有改变——这是印度在西藏问题上的原则立场。

藏地河流间接为约20亿人（约占世界人口四分之一）提供水资源

藏地文化与语言

藏地有大约2200年的广泛接受的历史，最近在藏地发现了可以追溯到十多万年前的人类居住证据。7世纪至9世纪之间，藏地成为中亚的一个大帝国，我们甚至短暂占领了中国的首都，领土延伸至今天乌兹别克斯坦的撒马尔罕。

世界屋脊：藏地的平均海拔4880米，面积250万平方公里

公元7世纪，我们发明了藏文。藏语源自印度梵文，与中文毫无关联——这两种语言完全不同。当印度佛教大师来藏地传教时，他们鼓励藏人用自己的语言翻译佛经。从8世纪到13世纪的500年间，在佛教几乎从印度消失之前，我们音译了所有可找到的梵语和巴利语佛经，将其译成藏文。今天，如果你想全面地研究佛教，藏语是世界上唯一可用的语言，甚至超过了印度语言本身。

去年12月14日，我们向国会图书馆捐赠了223本藏文词典，这说明了藏语本身的重要性。藏地面积约250万平方公里，几乎是日本面积的18倍，拥有305种不同的方言。高原上还有大量的锂、铜等资源。

图博与蒙古、中国的历史关系

13世纪时，藏地与蒙古人发展了关系——不是在成吉思汗时期，而是在其后。那时吐蕃王朝已经解体，藏人向蒙古人投降，但蒙古人并没有杀死藏人。反而藏人把蒙古人变成了佛教徒——所以今天所有的蒙古人都是佛教徒。这是一种神父与教友的关系，而不是现代民族国家定义中的从属关系。几十年后，忽必烈在1271年入侵了中国。

这里有一个重要的区别：我们和蒙古人有关系，但和中国皇帝没有关系。蒙古人从1271年到1368年统治中国，并不是中国汉人统治者。真正的汉族中国人——明朝——从1368年统治到1644年。那个时期我们和明朝没有太多政治关系，只有一些喇嘛互相拜访和交换头衔。

藏中统治者年代对照表：藏地各政权与中国历代王朝并非从属关系（来源：史密森尼学会）

随后满族（清朝）入主中原。在满族时期，满清对藏地有一些影响，尤其是18世纪——1720年他们进入藏地，不是为了入侵，而是为了帮助藏人对抗尼泊尔人，护送第七世达赖喇嘛从安多回到拉萨。满清最强盛是在1735年到1795年间，之后清朝自身也出现了问题。

清朝之后，民族主义者接管，开始把「藏地是中国的一部分」的叙事纳入国家话语，共产党继续沿用，于是有了「藏地自古以来就是中国的一部分」的说法。但中国政府本身也不知道「古代」指的是什么时候。

我这次来是为了推介一本新书——一位中国教授写的书。他大学时被教导藏地自古以来就是中国的一部分，后来他注意到中国共产党要求其他政府说藏地是中华人民共和国的一部分，这引起了他的好奇：如果藏地自古以来就是中国的一部分，为什么还需要另行要求别国承认？于是他开始研究，从明朝和清朝的历史档案中寻找证据，全部来自1949年之前印刷的中国官方文献。他的结论是：历史文献中没有任何证据支持藏地自古以来就是中国一部分的说法。中文版于2019年出版，至今中国政府无法对这一研究作出回应。

中间道路政策与当前形势

我们从1959年到大约1973年争取西藏独立，但当时刚从藏地流亡出来，没有一个政府支持我们。后来，尊者提出了「中间道路」政策——这是佛教的中道概念（Madhyamaka）。尊者的兄长当年去北京会见邓小平，邓小平说「我们可以讨论独立以外的任何事情」。我们以此为基础，在80年代初向藏地派遣了实况调查团，探索与中国谈判的可能性。

1987年，尊者第一次提出了五点和平建议：将藏地变成和平区、非军事化、无核化、保护藏地环境、进行谈判。中国没有给出正面回应。但尊者回来告诉藏人：你们必须决定未来的行动方针。通过公众舆论，藏人选择坚持尊者的立场，藏地流亡议会也一致通过了中间道路政策，寻求非暴力的、对中藏两国人民都有利的互利解决方案。

从2000年到2010年，有某种形式的中藏对话，尊者任命了特使，共进行了大约九轮会谈，但本质上是中国的缓兵之计，最终停止。在我任职期间，确实有秘密渠道，但目前没有实质性进展。习近平执政以来，前景不乐观。

2024年7月，拜登总统签署了《西藏问题解决促进法》。中国总是说「没有西藏问题」，西藏是「社会主义天堂」，那么为什么不允许人们自己去看呢？这项法律说：西藏争端尚未解决，需要根据国际法解决，它还提到了藏人的自决权，并明确指出，美国政府不接受中国关于「藏地自古以来是中国一部分」的错误历史叙事——这是第一次有政府正式反击中国的这一说法。

关于达赖喇嘛的转世问题：中国政府最关心的不是活着的达赖喇嘛，而是下一任，因为他们知道如果能控制第十六世达赖喇嘛，就能控制虔诚的藏人。他们在等待现任的达赖喇嘛去世。 2007年，他们通过了所谓的（国家宗教事务局）第五号令，规定中国政府负责最终授权喇嘛转世。而尊者的回答非常简单：我将出生在一个自由的世界，如果到那时藏地和中国都还不自由，达赖喇嘛不会在那里重生。尊者还说，如果中国政府真的认真对待轮回，应该先学习藏传佛教，也许先找到毛泽东的转世。中国政府的第二个立场是，按照传统，转世要通过金瓶掣签，一种原本是清朝这个一定程度上的佛教王朝，1793年为了帮助藏人对抗尼泊尔人时引入的。乾隆皇帝以完善西藏行政为理由，制定了《二十九条章程》，要求以“金瓶掣签”认定达赖喇嘛、班禅喇嘛和其他呼图克图的转世。但在些之前的八世达赖喇嘛都是完全按照传统方式选的，没有中国的任何干预。

他们最后在十一世班禅喇嘛转世时，滥用了所谓的“金瓶掣签”，1995年尊者达赖喇嘛挑选了一个六岁的小男孩子，认定他是班禅喇嘛后，中国政府绑架了他和他的家人，甚至是寻访团的僧人们，我们至今都不知道他们在哪里，不知道他是否还活着，他现在应该36 37了。中国政府用“金瓶掣签”的方式选出了他们制定的小男孩，通过在签底部加高的方式操作了选出来的结果。有一本书是讲这个选举操控的，书的作者是那次“金瓶掣签”的见证人，一位高僧（阿嘉仁波切）他就住在华盛顿DC。中国政府盗用了所谓“金瓶掣签”的概念。

第三点是，中国政府不相信任何宗教，是一个无神论的政党。尊者机智又幽默的回答，如果中国政府真的是认真的，应该开始学藏传佛教，了解轮回是什么，转世是藏传佛教独特的东西，可以追溯到900多年前，他的第一世就开始了的。要不然可以先去找找毛泽东的转世，邓小平的转世，啊现在江泽民也都死了，所以那个之后再考虑达赖喇嘛吧！

而且中国人看起来也很喜欢被崇拜的感觉，他们强迫藏人寺院挂着他们领导人的照片，从毛泽东到邓小平，到江泽民和习近平，还把名字打成藏语的。

我希望我给他们一个我的国家 图伯特Tibet 的概况介绍，以及我们如何与美国政府合作， 我们现在的处境是：藏地几个世纪以来一直是独立国家，1950年被占领。我们一直是中间道路的坚定支持者，我们也非常幸运，也许很多的政客你们不一定会喜欢，但是——当共和党和民主党人在许多议题上无法对话时，谈到藏地，他们总能站在一起支持我们。在加拿大也是一样，进步党保守党都是支持我们的。在印度也是一样的，所有的党派都是支持我们的，我们称之为图伯特全党议会支持小组。我们总是在尽可能的团结所有人，当有了新的领导人后，我们就得想办法去联系他们。

感谢唐纳德·Lu大使，他几乎以个人身份在西藏问题上工作了将近30年，并一直和我们密切合作。我们的西藏办事处的现任代表早先在乔治城演讲，也是应唐纳德的邀请来的。真的非常感谢大家的时间和关注，抱歉，我可以这样说上好几个小时。

问答环节

【主持人】

好，我们现在开始问答。西藏在世界许多地方都是一个情绪化的问题，包括在美国，所以请大家互相尊重，也尊重我们的嘉宾。我会在房间里走动。

【提问者一】

您提到的「解放」叙事引起了我的兴趣。中国的常见说法是：中国入侵藏地，把藏人从农奴制中解放出来。您怎么看这个叙事？

【司政边巴次仁】

中国总是用冠冕堂皇的话来掩盖自己的罪行。关于所谓的「农奴制」，我希望刘教授在这里做这方面的研究——他在中国文件中发现，从来没有关于藏地奴隶制度的记录，但他却发现了中国的奴隶制的记录，还有满洲和蒙古的奴隶制的记录。这就是历史档案所证明的。

当中国说「藏地是奴隶制和农奴制」，他们说得好像我们处于中世纪欧洲那样。事实并非如此。我们确实有一些庄园主以及与此相关的农民，某种程度上的农奴制，但远不像中世纪欧洲，甚至不像当时的中国那么糟糕。

谁在解放谁，从谁手中解放？我们从未要求中国来解放我们，解放我们也不是他们的工作。「解放」只是「占领」的另一个名称。这是中国政府试图用来美化侵略的故事——说他们把藏人从奴隶制中解放出来，这不是事实。

【提问者二】

非常感谢您今天的演讲。考虑到藏地对中华人民共和国的战略重要性，他们几乎不可能放弃对藏地的控制。您的中间道路方法，现实的愿景是什么？

【司政边巴次仁】

这正是为什么尊者达赖喇嘛提出中间道路而不是独立——如果藏地仍然是中国的一部分，中国就必须与我们达成协议，关于我们如何使用我们的自然资源和一切。尊者并不是要求独立，这一点必须让中国人民知道。

中国政府一直称达赖喇嘛为「分裂主义者」、「分离主义者」，但尊者并不是要求独立。中国政府没有把这一事实告诉中国人民——否则，有2.5亿到3亿中国佛教徒会给藏人更多的支持。许多中国人来藏地旅游，了解藏传佛教，他们生活在精神真空中，他们仰望藏地。

我们谈论的是互利的解决方案：因为中国在经济上发展，我们可以从中国的经济发展中受益；中国人可以从藏人那里获得精神上的滋养；而藏地的环境保护对中国人也非常重要。我们藏人和中国人在这些方面是一致的。只是中国领导人缺乏解决这一问题的智慧。

【提问者三】

总统先生，感谢您的光临。我想问：您有没有与尊者达赖喇嘛产生过分歧？您是如何处理这种分歧的？

【司政边巴次仁】

确实有相当数量的年轻藏人持不同意见，寻求完全独立。这是可以理解的——我年轻的时候也寻求西藏独立。但当你了解了全球政治、地缘政治和一切，你也就理解了我们的局限。

每当尊者说什么，他总是在做出决定之前经过多次深思熟虑。每次尊者说什么，我们都必须仔细考虑、分析，然后同意或不同意。但我总是倾向于赞同尊者，因为他是世界上最通情达理的人。他一直在寻求的是每个人的平静与幸福，不只是藏人的。

【追问者】

您认为中国方面是否担心：尊者达赖喇嘛百年之后，中间道路的理念会随之消逝，年轻人可能会走向寻求独立的路线？

【司政边巴次仁】

我们希望尊者能长命百岁。但这正是为什么我们现在采取的策略是在这个时间点聚焦藏地历史——我们可能会重新打开许多扇窗。

我们正在计划研究中国的不同情境：中国会发生什么，在各种外部力量和场景下，藏人面临的挑战和机遇是什么？这些是我们将继续做的事情——除非中国领导层有点解决这一问题的智慧。

综合编辑 校对 GD 翻译 Wilson

感谢Hoyas in Human Right 乔治城大学人权协会，Office of Tibet in DC 和所有让这次活动发生的人！

达兰萨拉——图伯特独立运动的真正斗士 拉桑·次仁于2026年6月11日在达兰萨拉逝世。他是一位诗人、作家，也是图伯特独立事业的坚定倡导者。世界各地的藏人，包括自由斗士、活动家和学者，都为这一巨大损失深表哀悼，并通过各种实际行动和文字，缅怀他为图伯特独立所做的贡献。

Read in English

2026年6月11日，藏人自由斗士 拉桑·次仁 在印度北部的 达兰萨拉逝世。达兰萨拉是藏人行政中央总部所在地，同时也是达赖喇嘛尊者的住所。他是一位诗人、作家和社会活动家，也是图博独立的坚定倡导者。他曾担任藏人青年大会（藏青会）主席，是位于达兰萨拉的阿尼玛卿学院的创始院长，并曾担任《图伯特评论》（Tibet review）的编辑。

直到生命的最后一刻，他仍在呼吁回到他的祖国图伯特。世界各地的藏人，包括自由斗士、活动家和学者，都为这一巨大损失深表哀悼，并通过实际行动和文字向他为图伯特独立所进行的斗争致以敬意。

2026年6月15日凌晨4点，图伯特独立运动家拉桑·次仁的遗体在达兰萨拉火化。达兰萨拉地区的藏人哀悼这一重大损失，并缅怀他为藏民族的自由而奋斗以及为流亡藏人所做的贡献。

藏人行政中央安全部于 2026 年 4 月 27 日举办了“图伯特自由斗士大会”，拉桑·次仁长者因其对图伯特事业的重大贡献而被授予“图伯特自由斗士勋章”。

拉桑·次仁1952年出生于图伯特西部阿里地区，后随父母和两位兄长一同逃往印度。1962年，他进入穆索里藏人中央学校学习。1972年，他获得机会前往美国约翰·霍普金斯大学医学院深造，但他放弃了这个机会，决定加入驻扎在尼泊尔木斯塘的藏人抵抗武装部队。

他于1972年加入图伯特抵抗武装部队。然而，1974年木斯塘大本营关闭，两年后他不得不返回达兰萨拉。他曾在图伯特政策研究分析办公室工作过一段时间。之后，他加入达兰萨拉的TCV藏人儿童村（Tibet Children Village），并在杰尊·白玛主任的带领下，将小学扩建为中学。1976年至1982年期间，他担任藏人儿童村总校的校长。

1983 年 3 月，在达赖喇嘛尊者的建议下，拉桑·次仁加入了流亡政府新闻办公室。他创建了纳塘印刷厂，并建造了现在的纳塘大楼，该大楼现在是藏人行政中央信息与国际关系部 (DIIR) 的所在地。

1986年，他当选为藏人青年大会主席。在他担任藏人青年大会主席期间，当拉萨在1988年底和1989年3月爆发了声势浩大的争取图伯特独立的政治抗议活动，他在新德里和印度其他地区组织了和平抗议和绝食活动。

他还广泛游历了印度各地，并前往美国、加拿大、欧洲、泰国和澳大利亚。1978年至1979年间，他曾在日本生活一年。1980年，他还在境内藏区旅行了约三个月。1979年至1980年，他访问了图伯特，亲眼目睹了藏人在中国统治下所面临的现实压迫。这段经历深深地触动了他，也更加坚定了他毕生致力于图伯特事业的决心。

1988年6月15日，拉桑成为首位公开反对达赖喇嘛尊者“中间道路”政策的藏人。他反对该政策主张不再继续争取独立，而是仅通过和平谈判寻求“中华人民共和国境内的藏区真正自治”。1989年，拉桑再次当选藏人青年大会主席。但由于反对“中间道路”政策而引发种种困难，他于1990年底辞职。

1992年，他作为创始人之一与扎西次仁、班马奔和 嘉央诺布 共同创立了阿尼玛卿学院（图伯特高级研究学院），旨在在传统藏族社会中推广国际化和世俗文化。从1992年到1999年，他放下个人事务，全职在阿尼玛卿学院担任志愿者。在此期间，他协助学院进行筹款、行政管理、翻译和编辑工作。他于1999年辞职。

他在上达兰萨拉创办了第一家书店，名为“书虫”。他还创作书籍、文章和诗歌。他的第一本著作是2003年出版的《明日及其他诗歌》。2009年，他出版了第二本著作《旋律之海》，这是对第六世达赖喇嘛诗歌的译作。2012年，他出版了第三本著作《坚持》。他的著名诗歌包括《我不愿让图伯特消亡》、《国家、民族、自由》、《图伯特需要你》、《渴望》、《等待》和《自由的馈赠》。

以下是诗歌 《我不愿图伯特消亡》：

拉桑·次仁

我不愿图伯特消亡，

我不愿图伯特消失，

我不愿图伯特被摧毁——

不，我不愿图伯特消亡。

我不愿图伯特被中国占领，

我不愿我的孩子被称为中国人，

我不愿我的孩子变成中国人——

不，我不愿图伯特消亡。

近日，包括自由斗士、活动家、学者在内的众多藏人以及藏人组织纷纷举行祈祷仪式，悼念这位伟大的逝者，并向他为争取图伯特自由而进行的无畏斗争致敬。加拿大多康四水六岗协会 写道：“加拿大多康四水六岗协会 怀着沉痛的心情，与世界各地的藏人一起，悼念拉桑·次仁——这位爱国者、自由斗士、作家、诗人，也是图伯特最无畏、最坚定的声音之一。”

该非政府组织表示：“他说话坦诚、坚定、勇敢，即使在困难的情况下也是如此。他的话语唤醒了人们的心灵，增强了人们的决心，并激励了无数藏人继续为自由和正义而奋斗。”

“作为多康四水六岗协会的成员，我们对他毕生对图伯特抵抗运动的尊重和支持深表感激。他深刻理解那些勇敢的男女为保卫图伯特所做出的牺牲，并孜孜不倦地努力确保他们的故事和贡献永不被遗忘。愿我们不仅用言语缅怀他，更以我们对他毕生珍视的事业的持续投入来纪念他。他的精神遗产将激励一代又一代的藏人，他对图伯特的坚定奉献精神也将永世铭记。”该组织总结道。

藏人儿童村写道：“藏人儿童村全体成员怀着无比沉痛和崇高的敬意，悼念拉桑·次仁先生的逝世。拉桑·次仁先生曾是藏人儿童村的学生、教育工作者、领袖者、爱国者、作家、活动家，也是图伯特自由运动中最忠诚的倡导者之一。他于2026年6月11日逝世，留下了奉献、牺牲以及对藏民族自由事业坚定不移的承诺这一非凡遗产”。

原作者：丹增·拉珍 2026年6月15日

译者：Wilson 编辑：Ginger Duan

Original:

Tibet Post | Tibetan freedom activist dies; people mourn this great loss

藏传佛教的活佛转世制度，从十三世纪第二世噶玛巴开始，到今天已经七百多年了。其根基立在佛教的轮回观与菩萨乘愿再来之上。高僧圆寂前留下预言，弟子们透过观湖、密访、打卦、辨认遗物、询问护法，最后由高僧大德依宗教仪轨确认转世灵童。达赖喇嘛世系始于第一世根敦珠巴，第三世索南嘉措于1578年在仰华寺会见蒙古土默特部俺答汗，获赠达赖尊号。整套体系从根上讲，合法性的来源是佛法、是教义、是藏地人民的信仰，从来不在哪一个尘世政权的玺印上。

The Tibetan Buddhist tradition of recognizing reincarnated lamas, or tulkus, began in the thirteenth century with the Second Karmapa, Karma Pakshi, and has continued for more than seven hundred years. Its foundations rest on the Buddhist understanding of rebirth and on the Mahayana belief that enlightened beings choose to return to this world out of compassion for all living beings. Before a revered lama passes away, he may leave behind prophecies. His disciples then set out to find his successor through a range of practices: gazing into sacred lakes for visions, conducting discreet inquiries in communities near and far, consulting oracles, presenting a young child with objects that once belonged to the deceased lama, and seeking guidance from protective deities. Final confirmation comes from senior religious figures acting in accordance with established ritual procedure. The Dalai Lama lineage traces back to the First Dalai Lama, Gendun Drup. The Third Dalai Lama, Sonam Gyatso, traveled to Yanghua Monastery in 1578, where he met Altan Khan of the Tümed Mongols and received the honorific title “Dalai,” meaning “ocean” in Mongolian. At its core, this entire tradition draws its legitimacy from Buddhist teaching, doctrine, and the faith of the Tibetan people. It has never depended on the seal of any worldly government.

今天围绕十四世达赖喇嘛尊者转世的争论，主要就是以下三点。第一，宗教事务的归属之争:教内仪轨与世俗主权，谁说了算。第二，历史叙事的解释之争:西藏在元、明、清、民国、中华人民共和国之间，究竟处于什么样的法理位置。第三，现实政治的角力:中共需要“自己的达赖”来加固对藏地的合法性叙事。

The current controversy surrounding the reincarnation of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama centers on three separate but related disputes. The first is a question of jurisdiction: when religious procedure and state authority come into conflict, who has the final say? The second concerns the interpretation of history: what was Tibet’s actual legal and political relationship with the successive governments of China, from the Yuan and Ming dynasties through the Qing, the Republic of China, and the People’s Republic? The third is simply a contest of political power: the Chinese Communist Party needs its own Dalai Lama in order to reinforce the story it tells about its legitimacy in Tibet.

先说最荒谬的一条。一个党章明文规定党员不得有宗教信仰、官方哲学是辩证唯物主义的政党，今天居然要决定谁能转世，谁如何转世。这件事本身，已经荒谬到近乎黑色幽默。一个不相信来世的人，居然要替全体藏人决定菩萨化身投生何处。真是滑天下之大稽。马克思的著作里，也没有哪一句写过：共产党拥有管理投胎的权力。既然如此想要寻找转世，不如找找毛泽东邓小平江泽民的转世，顺便还能帮助习近平总书记解决下接班人问题。

Start with the most glaring absurdity. Here is a political party whose own charter explicitly prohibits members from holding religious beliefs and whose official governing philosophy is dialectical materialism. Yet this very party now claims the authority to determine who may be reincarnated and under what conditions. The situation borders on dark comedy. A group of people who do not believe in any afterlife has appointed itself the arbiter of where a bodhisattva’s consciousness will next take birth, acting on behalf of an entire people. Nothing in the collected works of Karl Marx contains so much as a sentence suggesting that a Communist Party holds authority over the process of death and rebirth. If the Party is so intent on locating living reincarnations, perhaps it should begin by searching for the reincarnations of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin. That effort might even help General Secretary Xi Jinping resolve his own succession problem.

再说史料。中共论证「中央政府对达赖转世有最终决定权」时，第一条是1252年蒙哥汗赐噶玛拔希金边黑帽。可蒙哥是蒙古大汗，他治下还没有现代意义上的「中国」，也没有所谓的「中央政府」。把蒙古帝国和藏传佛教之间的施主—僧侣关系直接论证为今天北京对西藏宗教事务的主权依据，本质上是一种后来的政治叙事，而不是历史事实。第二条是乾隆设立的金瓶掣签。然而十四位达赖喇嘛尊者里只有第十、十一、十二世是经金瓶掣签产生的。这三位分别在二十岁、十七岁、十九岁圆寂，藏地史述普遍认为他们死于是政治毒杀。其余十一位达赖喇嘛，包括伟大的五世和当今第十四世，都没有经过金瓶掣签。一个总共只实施过三次、而且三次都伴随巨大争议的制度，今天却被奉为「必须坚持的历史定制」，是“祖宗之法不可变”，这是选择性使用历史。北京总说「绝无国外寻访转世先例」，可第四世达赖云丹嘉措本人就出生在蒙古土默特部，是俺答汗的曾孙。那一片土地在他出生时是独立的蒙古政治实体,与明朝之间只有羁縻朝贡关系,根本谈不上明朝的行政管辖。也足以说明，所谓“转世必须由中央政府批准”的说法，并不是藏传佛教自身传统。

Now for the historical record. When the Chinese Communist Party argues that the central government holds ultimate authority over the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, its first piece of evidence is the claim that Möngke Khan bestowed a gold-trimmed black hat upon Karma Pakshi around 1252. But Möngke Khan was the Great Khan of the Mongol Empire. Under his rule, there was no entity that could reasonably be called “China” in the modern sense, and there was certainly no such thing as a Chinese “central government.” To take the patron-priest relationship between the Mongol Empire and Tibetan Buddhism and use it as evidence for Beijing’s present-day sovereignty over Tibetan religious affairs is not historical argument. It is a political narrative constructed after the fact.

The Party’s second piece of evidence is the Golden Urn lottery system, established by Emperor Qianlong. But of the fourteen Dalai Lamas in history, only the Tenth, Eleventh, and Twelfth were actually selected through the Golden Urn. Those three lamas died at approximately twenty-one, seventeen, and eighteen years of age, respectively, and Tibetan historical accounts widely hold that they were killed for political reasons. The remaining eleven Dalai Lamas, including the revered Fifth and the current Fourteenth, were never selected through the Golden Urn at all. A procedure that was applied in only three cases out of fourteen, and each time amid serious controversy, is now being elevated to the status of a sacred and unbreakable historical precedent. This is the selective use of history, nothing more.

Beijing also insists that there is no precedent for seeking a reincarnation outside of Chinese-controlled territory. Yet the Fourth Dalai Lama, Yonten Gyatso, was himself born in Tümed Mongolia and was the great-grandson of Altan Khan. At the time of his birth, that territory was an independent Mongol political entity. Its relationship with the Ming dynasty consisted of loose tributary ties and nothing more; the Ming exercised no administrative control over that land whatsoever. This example alone is sufficient to show that the claim that reincarnations must receive approval from a central government has no basis in Tibetan Buddhist tradition.

十世班禅圆寂后，达赖喇嘛尊者于1995年5月认定六岁的根敦确吉尼玛为十一世班禅，他从此消失，至今三十年下落不明。同年11月，北京方面组织金瓶掣签，确立了坚赞诺布为十一世班禅。这位「中央政府批准」的汉班禅，在藏地处于一个无比尴尬的境地。前几年第七世贡唐仓仁波切在拉卜楞寺主持法会，甘南草原上信众的帐篷绵延数里，一眼望不到头，僧俗如海。同样是在甘南、汉班禅出席活动的时候，如果不是强制要求，可能都无人到场。当然中共可以用程序立一个假的仁波切，但假的终究是假的，成不了真的。真正的信不是权力可以制造出来的。

After the death of the Tenth Panchen Lama, the Dalai Lama formally recognized six-year-old Gedhun Choekyi Nyima as the Eleventh Panchen Lama in May 1995. The boy disappeared shortly afterward, and his whereabouts have remained unknown for more than thirty years. That November, Beijing organized its own Golden Urn lottery and installed Gyaincain Norbu as the Eleventh Panchen Lama. The state-appointed Panchen Lama occupies a deeply awkward position in Tibetan religious life. A few years ago, the Seventh Gungthang Rinpoche presided over a religious assembly at Labrang Monastery. Across the grasslands of the Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, the tents of the faithful stretched for miles in every direction, a vast sea of monks and laypeople gathered in devotion. In that same region, when the Beijing-installed Panchen Lama appears at official functions, the turnout is sparse unless attendance is compelled. A government can appoint a false rinpoche through bureaucratic procedure, but a false rinpoche remains false and cannot become true. Genuine faith is something that no political authority can manufacture.

北京最不明白的一点就在这里。它总觉得，西藏问题只是“达赖问题”。只要等十四世达赖喇嘛尊者圆寂，确立一个自己的达赖，一切就能结束。可它没意识到，真正的问题恰恰是：它从来没有真正得到过藏人的心。得其心，斯得民矣。

This is the point Beijing has never managed to understand. It believes that the problem of Tibet is, at bottom, the problem of the Dalai Lama. Once the Fourteenth Dalai Lama passes away and Beijing installs its own successor, the thinking goes, the matter will finally be resolved. What it fails to see is that the real problem is exactly this: Beijing has never truly won the hearts of the Tibetan people. Win the hearts of the people, and you win the people themselves.

一个几乎可以预见的未来：尊者圆寂之后，北京必然会推出自己的达赖喇嘛。可是藏地的僧俗大众绝不会认可他。即便有寺院被迫表态接受，那种被迫本身就是下一轮长期对抗的种子。这只是把过去三十年的班禅模式做一遍复制。中共在涉藏问题上选择的从来都是下下策。

The outline of future events is easy enough to trace. After the Dalai Lama passes away, Beijing will certainly put forward its own candidate. The monks and laypeople of Tibet will not accept him. Even if some monasteries are compelled to publicly endorse the choice, the coercion itself will plant the seeds of the next long cycle of resistance. This would be nothing more than a repetition of the Panchen Lama pattern, replayed over the next three decades. In its approach to Tibet, Beijing has consistently chosen the worst available path.

由此，我们也能看到北京的恐惧，它太害怕一个自己无法控制的东西。宗教让极权恐惧的就是：它不依赖枪、不依赖党组织任命。它存在于人的内心。而人心，从来都不是坦克能彻底征服的东西。

All of this reveals something essential about the nature of Beijing’s fear. It is terrified of anything it cannot control. What makes religion so unsettling to authoritarian regimes is precisely this quality: it does not depend on guns, on official documents, or on appointments handed down by the state. It lives in the human heart. And the human heart has never been something that tanks can fully conquer.

藏传佛教的转世制度，经历了蒙古大汗、满清皇帝、民国政府的兴衰，至今仍在运行。这个制度比中华人民共和国年长七百年，比中国共产党年长六百多年。一个本质上并不稳定的极权政权，其实没有想象中那么强大。它看起来无所不能，但恰恰因为恐惧，才想控制一切。可有些东西是控制不了的。比如信仰、比如记忆、比如一个民族心里真正认同谁。天视自我民视，天听自我民听。民心所向，才是未来的方向。藏地的命运终将由藏人自己决定。

The Tibetan Buddhist tradition of recognizing reincarnated lamas has survived the rise and fall of the Mongol khans, the Qing emperors, and the Republican government of China. This tradition is seven hundred years older than the People’s Republic of China and more than six hundred years older than the Chinese Communist Party itself. A fundamentally unstable authoritarian regime is not, in the end, as powerful as it appears. It looks omnipotent precisely because it is afraid, and because it is afraid, it seeks to control everything. But some things cannot be controlled: faith, memory, and the question of whom a people truly recognize as their own. Heaven sees as the people see; Heaven hears as the people hear. The direction of the people’s hearts is the direction of the future. The fate of Tibet will ultimately be decided by the Tibetan people themselves.

以上

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March 1989: Martial Law in Lhasa

Q: A few months prior to June 4th, as a journalist for the People’s Liberation Army Daily (PLA Daily), you boarded a military plane packed with soldiers and traveled to Lhasa. At the time, the Chinese government had imposed martial law to suppress demonstrations by Tibetans. What did you learn in Lhasa?

A: On March 8, 1989, I learned about the martial law in Lhasa from the news broadcast on China National Radio. On the 9th, I took the first plane deployed for the martial law operation to Chengdu, and then flew to Lhasa with the first batch of soldiers. At that time, the entire city of Lhasa was in chaos. Lhasa is very small; its center is just the Potala Palace and the Barkhor Street area. There were burned-down shops everywhere. The task assigned to me by the newspaper was not to report publicly, but to write “internal reference” reports (neican).

I didn’t understand at the time why several protests in Tibet were defined as riots, and specifically as monks rebelling. In my imagination back then, monks in monasteries were all very quiet, just sitting there chanting scriptures and such—how could they take to the streets to rebel? I saw some internal materials stating that they were waving the Snow Lion flag and demanding Tibetan independence.

During my time there, I interviewed the chief of the Lhasa Public Security Bureau. I asked him why there was a need for martial law. The Lhasa police chief said, “There is absolutely no need for you guys to be here.” I asked why. “Isn’t it because you couldn’t handle it yourselves that the army needed to come in?” He said, “Nonsense! Lhasa is such a small place; I know almost all of those troublemakers. What kind of police chief would I be if I couldn’t handle them?” To prove this, he even took me to the prison to demonstrate face-to-face his close familiarity with those inmates.

He said that at the time, they just watched as those people set fire to Barkhor Street, burning down the shops one by one, because the shops on Barkhor Street were all run by Han Chinese. After the “reform and opening up,” first people from the Chengdu area, and then carpenters from the Zhejiang area, came to Lhasa, primarily to sell electronics and make traditional Tibetan cabinets. Their businesses were booming more than the Tibetans’, and the Tibetan cabinets they crafted were even more beautiful than those made by the Tibetans themselves. Consequently, these Tibetans felt that the outsiders had stolen their livelihoods, and they resented them. They took advantage of the unrest to burn down their shops.

Logically speaking, this constitutes criminal behavior—how can you just burn down someone else’s shop? But the orders the police received were that no one was allowed to take action. Forbidden from acting, they could only watch as these people committed arson, burning down the shops one by one until they were all gone. The fire eventually reached the Barkhor Street police station, where he was stationed, completely surrounding them. Finally, left with no other choice—since they couldn’t just wait to die—he ordered a police officer to ram a motorcycle through the wall to smash a hole, and they escaped through that opening.

I also interviewed the commander of the Tibet Military District. The commander told me that when Barkhor Street was on fire, the troops had already assembled. At that time, it was the Armed Police, sitting in their trucks, but no one was allowed to act. What were they waiting for? They were waiting for orders from the central government. In reality, the Tibet Autonomous Region has no autonomous power. Once this reality was established, the central government ordered martial law. When the Armed Police troops finally charged into Barkhor Street, they simply opened fire, killing and injuring many innocent merchants and pilgrims. After martial law was imposed, the prisons were filled to capacity with arrested individuals.

At the time, the Party Secretary of the Autonomous Region was Hu Jintao. When the main martial law forces arrived, Lhasa welcomed the People’s Liberation Army entering the city. I was standing right next to Hu Jintao, but I don’t know where he was when Barkhor Street was being burned; I never asked him.

Q: What was your conclusion at the time? And how did that experience influence your view of the official handling of the demonstrations in Beijing?

A: At the time, we were just trying to understand the reactions of various sectors in Lhasa to the martial law, and everyone believed it was unnecessary. It was a waste of manpower and resources. They were asking, “Why did you even have to come?” Furthermore, having killed and injured innocent people, how were they going to face them in the future? I went to the hospital for interviews, and the medical staff were in tears as they spoke: “To build Tibet, we have dedicated our youth and our descendants. With martial law and the opening of fire, shooting them up like this, how are we supposed to live here in the future?”

A comrade-in-arms of my sister from her time in the military had a father who was the Director of Operations for the Tibet Military District, having entered Tibet with Zhang Guohua in 1950. I consulted him, and he brought up the issue of corruption to me for the very first time; I had never heard anyone talk about it like that before. He asked me, “What does the current Tibet Military District commander’s office look like?” I replied, “The office floor is covered with khaden (traditional Tibetan woven carpets) all the way into the bathroom.” He said, “How corrupt! Back in the day, Zhang Guohua’s office was just a single desk, a wooden bed, and a wooden chair. His relationship with the Tibetans was excellent. That relationship has been completely destroyed. Now, their relationship with the common people and the Tibetans has deteriorated to the point where they can only deal with them using guns.”

I sent five “internal reference” reports (neican) to the newspaper regarding the situations I had uncovered. They were all focused on the problems, touching on Tibet’s ethnic and religious policies and attitudes toward martial law. A few people from the Xinhua News Agency’s military branch who had traveled with us—reporters stationed in Chengdu—claimed they had been to Tibet countless times and were already very familiar with it, so they just stayed inside the military district compound, chatting with the leaders.

Their conclusion was that this martial law was absolutely necessary. They argued that the suppression of the 1959 rebellion had guaranteed 30 years of peace in Tibet, and that the 1989 martial law would secure another 30 years of peace. I told them, “That is a fallacy.” He replied that relying on military force and violence was the only way to make them submit.

He asked me why it was a fallacy. I explained that in 1959, the regime was unstable, and the Tibetan army had guns; you could use armed force to counter their armed force. But 30 years later, these Tibetan civilians are unarmed, and your regime has stabilized. You could absolutely rely on the rule of law—the police chief himself said he could have solved the problem.

However, all five of my neican (internal reference reports) were withheld and “killed” [spiked by the editors]. The reason given was bizarre: they said the military should not interfere in politics. I thought to myself: Your army has already been deployed; you are already interfering in politics.

April 1989: Beijing Students Take to the Streets

Q: You returned to Beijing in April, just as the student demonstrations were beginning. How did you view the student demonstrations at that time?

A: On my way home, I passed through Tiananmen Square. Our home was over in Huangsi, in the dormitories of the General Political Department.

Passing through Tiananmen Square, I noticed there were so many people. That day happened to be the day Hu Yaobang passed away, and Tiananmen was an absolute sea of people. Furthermore, people said you could go to Hu Yaobang’s house to pay your condolences. His home was very close to Tiananmen, so I followed the crowd there to pay my respects. Later on, when I met Hu Deping [Hu Yaobang’s son], I told him, “This is actually our second time shaking hands.” He asked when the first time was, and I said, “It was when your father passed away; I went to your house, and you shook hands with every single person who came to mourn.” Their family members are all quite approachable and possess a strong connection to the common people.

At that time, I was struck by how many people there could be, and I went back and talked about it with my friends in the General Logistics Department. They asked, “Does it compare to when Zhou Enlai passed away?” I said, “It’s about the same.”

At the time, I actually disapproved of and didn’t really agree with the students taking to the streets. Why? Because Hu Yaobang’s forced resignation stemmed from the earlier campaign against “bourgeois liberalization,” it was the students who took to the streets back then who ultimately led to his downfall.

Therefore, I remember saying during a discussion meeting at the General Logistics Department that people like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang were among the very few remaining, highly exceptional leaders within the Communist Party who possessed an open-minded awareness. After 1949, there were endless political campaigns, followed by the Cultural Revolution. The relentless waves of these movements constantly sifted through the Communist Party cadres, and many people died during them. The fact that these men managed to survive and still maintain an open-minded perspective meant such leaders were exceedingly rare. We should protect them and cooperate with them, rather than oppose them. I argued that the ultimate result would simply be to force them out of power, which is exactly what happened to Hu Yaobang in 1987.

The students’ protests lasted for a long time. One weekend, when it was time to head home again, I witnessed several military vehicles of the 38th Army being blocked in Tiananmen Square. This was not yet “June 4th,” and I didn’t know what mission they were on. They were surrounded, layer upon layer, by students and citizens who told them to go back, saying that Beijing didn’t need them. I felt that these soldiers were in a very awkward position.

Returning from Tibet, I remembered that in Lhasa, it was the Armed Police who opened fire, not the People’s Liberation Army. The ordinary citizens had welcomed the army into the city, feeling that soldiers and the Armed Police were different: the Armed Police shoot at us, while the soldiers come in to protect us. Furthermore, I felt that the military’s mission is external—to resist foreign aggression—not to deal with common citizens; internal affairs should be handled by the Armed Police and the regular police.

Later, feeling indignant about it, I went straight to the newspaper office, found my boss, Qian Gang, and asked him if I should write an internal reference report (neican). He asked what it would be about. I said I wanted to suggest that the military should not intervene in local governmental affairs. If they absolutely had to participate, the soldiers carrying out the orders should change into Armed Police uniforms. Otherwise, it would be hard to play your cards in the future. It’s just like playing cards: if you play the big joker right from the start, you’ll have no cards left to play.

May 1989: Martial Law in Beijing

Q: Where were you when the State Council announced martial law? What was your reaction?

A: I was in Beijing. I disapproved of it at the time, because I had just come back from Lhasa and because I saw the overall situation. The students were maintaining excellent order during the protests themselves, and there were no incidents of beating, smashing, or looting in Beijing. The social order in Beijing was surprisingly good those few days—even the thieves went on strike. So, I didn’t feel there was any need for it. Moreover, the conclusion we reached in Lhasa was that it was unnecessary.

Q: After martial law was announced, based on your experience in Lhasa, did it ever cross your mind that they would open fire?

A: I never thought they would, because at that time, we still held high expectations for the military and the government. We felt they wouldn’t do something so outrageous.

Original：纽约时报｜前军官谈“六四”：派军队清场，就不好再出牌了

References：唯色 | 1989年：消失的3月10日，以及《六月某时》

NYT｜CHINA PUTS LHASA UNDER ARMY RULE

1989年3月：拉萨戒严

问：六月四号前几个月，作为《解放军报》的记者，你登上了一架满载士兵的军用飞机，去了拉萨。当时中国政府实施军事戒严来镇压藏族人的示威活动。你在拉萨了解了什么？

答：1989年3月8日，我在中央人民广播电台新闻联播中知道拉萨戒严，9号乘参加戒严的第一架飞机到达成都，之后与第一批军人飞到拉萨。那时，整个拉萨城一片混乱。拉萨很小，它的中心就是布达拉宫和八角街那块。到处是被烧的店铺。报社给我的任务就是，不要公开报道，写内参。

那时我不理解，为什么西藏的几次游行都被定义为骚乱，而且是僧人造反。那个时候想象，寺庙里的和尚都很安静，在那儿念经什么的，怎么会上街造反？看到一些内部的材料，说他们打着雪山狮子旗要求西藏独立。

期间我访问了拉萨市公安局局长。我问他，为什么要戒严？拉萨公安局局长说，根本不需要你们来。我问为什么？你们自己搞不定，才需要军队进来呀？他说，哪里！拉萨这么小的地方，那些闹事的人我几乎都认识。搞不定他们我还当什么公安局长。为此还带我去监狱，当面证明那些犯人与他的密切关系。

他说当时就看着这些人烧八角街，一间一间烧店铺，因为八角街店铺都是汉人开的。开放以后先是成都那边的一些人，再就是浙江那边的木匠，他们到拉萨，主要是卖电器和打藏柜。他们生意做得比藏人红火，藏柜打得比藏人还漂亮，所以这些藏人就觉得你们把我们的活儿给抢了，他们恨那些人。就乘着闹事把他们店铺烧了。

按理说这属于犯罪行为，你怎么可以烧人家店铺呢？但是他们接到的命令是，谁都不许动。不许动就看着这些人烧，一间、一间全部都烧完了，最后烧到他坐镇的八角街派出所，火把他们包围了，最后没有办法，不能等死啊。他就让一个民警，骑着摩托车把墙撞开一个洞，从洞里跑出去了。

我还访问了西藏军区的司令，司令告诉我，八角街着火时，部队已经集结了，那时候是武警，在卡车上，但是大家都不许动，在等什么呢？等中央的命令。西藏自治区实质上是没有自治权力的。造成这样的事实，中央下令戒严。武警部队冲进八角街就开枪，打死打伤很多无辜的商人和香客。戒严后抓的人监狱都满了。

那时候自治区书记是胡锦涛，戒严大部队到的时候，拉萨欢迎解放军进城。我站在胡锦涛旁边，但是不知道烧八角街的时候他在什么地方，没有问过他。

问：你当时是什么结论？当时的经历又是如何影响了你对官方处理北京示威活动的看法？

答：我们当时就是了解拉萨各界对戒严的反应，都认为不需要。劳民伤财呀，说你们为什么要来？而且打死打伤无辜的人，将来怎么面对他们。我到医院采访，那些医护人员说着都流眼泪，“为建设西藏我们献了青春献子孙，戒严开枪，把他们打成这样，我们以后怎么在这里生活？”

我妹妹当兵时的一位战友，她父亲是1950年跟张国华一起进藏的西藏军区作战部长。我请教他，他对我第一次提出来腐败问题，此前我还没听别人这样讲过。他问我，现在西藏军区司令的办公室是什么样的？我说，办公室地上铺着卡垫儿（藏人编织的地毯）一直铺到卫生间。他说，多腐败啊！当年张国华的办公室就是一张桌子，一张木床，一把木椅。与藏人关系好得很。这个关系完全被破坏了。现在他们跟老百姓、藏民的关系，就是只能用枪来对付。

我把了解的这些情况向报社发了五份内参，都是讲的问题，涉及西藏的民族政策、宗教政策和对戒严的态度等。跟我们一起去的新华社军分社的几个人，因为是驻成都的记者，说已经无数次来西藏，对西藏很熟悉，就在军区大院里跟领导们谈。

他们的结论是这次戒严非常必要。认为59年那次平叛保证了西藏30年的和平，89年的戒严还会再保障西藏30年和平。我说你这是谬论啊，他说就是要靠武力、暴力才能让他们服从。他问为什么是谬论。我说59年的时候政权不稳定，而且那时藏军有枪，你可以用武装来对付他的武装，但是30年之后这些藏民没有武装，而且你的政权已经稳定了，你完全可以用法治的方法，公安局长说他就可以解决问题。

但是我的五篇内参全部被扣住了，被枪毙了。理由很奇怪，说是军队不要干政。我心说，你军队都开出去了，已经干政了。

1989年4月：北京学生上街

问：你四月份回到了北京，当时学生的示威活动刚刚开始。你是怎么看学生的示威活动的？

答：我回家路过天安门广场，我们家在黄寺那儿，是总政的宿舍。

路过天安门广场的时候就发现怎么那么多人啊，那天正好是胡耀邦去世，天安门人山人海的。而且他们说可以去胡耀邦家吊唁。他们家离天安门很近，我就顺着人流到他们家去吊唁，后来我见到胡德平，我说咱们已经是第二次握手了。他说还有什么时候，我说就是你父亲去世的时候，我到你们家，你跟每一个去吊唁的人握手。他们家的人都比较亲民，有平民意识。

那时候我觉得怎么会有那么多人，我回去还跟我总后的那些朋友说。他们问，比得过周恩来去世吗？我说差不多啊。那时候我对学生上街不以为然，不是很赞成，为什么呢，因为胡耀邦下台就是因为第一次反对自由化，那个时候就是学生上街，导致胡耀邦下台。所以我记得我那个时候在总后开会讨论，我说，像胡耀邦、赵紫阳这样的人，是共产党仅存的非常优秀的、有开放意识的领导人。49年以后不停地搞政治运动，然后又文革，大浪淘沙不断地淘共产党的干部，很多人在运动中死去了。他们能够活着，而且具有开放的意识，这种领导人非常少了，应该保护他们，跟他们配合而不是反对他们。我说最后的结果把他们弄下台， 胡耀邦在1987年时就是这样的。

学生的游行持续了很长时间。一个周末，又是回家的时候，我在天安门广场目睹了当时三十八军的几辆军车被堵在广场，还不是“六四”，不知道他们去执行什么任务，里三层外三层的全部被学生和市民给围住，让他们回去，说北京不需要他们，所以我觉得这些士兵很尴尬。

我从西藏回来，拉萨开枪的不是解放军是武警，老百姓欢迎部队进城，觉得军人和武警不一样，武警开枪打我们，军人进来保护我们。而且我觉得军人的任务就是对外的，抗击外敌侵略，而不是对老百姓的，对内应该是武警和警察。后来我就不忿儿，直接去报社，找我的头儿钱钢说，要不要写一个内参。他说什么内容，我说建议军队不要参与地方的政务，如非要参加，执行的军人要换成武警的服装。否则将来你就不好出牌了。就跟打牌似的，上来就出大王，你没牌可出了。

89年5月：北京戒严

问：当时国务院宣布戒严的时候你在哪儿？什么反应呢？

答：在北京，我那个时候是不赞成的，因为我从拉萨回来，还有我看到整个情况。学生自己把游行的秩序维持得很好，北京市也没有发生打砸抢事件，北京市的社会治安那几天出奇得好，连小偷儿都罢工了，所以没觉得有这个必要。而且我们在拉萨的时候得出的结论也是没这个必要。

问：当时宣布戒严以后，凭你在拉萨的经验，你有没有想到他们会开枪？

答：也没有想到，因为那个时候对军队、对政府是有很大期待的，觉得他们不会做那么离谱的事儿。

原文：纽约时报｜前军官谈“六四”：派军队清场，就不好再出牌了

参考资料：唯色 | 1989年：消失的3月10日，以及《六月某时》

NYT｜CHINA PUTS LHASA UNDER ARMY RULE

【插画展 | 第14世达赖喇嘛尊者的非凡一生】

🗓 2026年 2月13日 – 6月7日

📍 佐治亚州 Oglethorpe University Museum of Art（OUMA）
4484 Peachtree Road, NE, Lowry Hall, 3rd Floor, Brookhaven, Georgia 30319

本次展览将展出艺术家藤田里马 创作的 14 幅绘画作品，呈现第十四世达赖喇嘛尊者一生所践行的慈悲、非暴力与和平精神。同时，展览重点展出藤田对第十四世达赖喇嘛的深度访谈。达赖喇嘛一生饱经磨难，辗转各地，并致力于在全球范围内倡导和平。尽管面临诸多挑战，尊者始终以乐观和慈悲著称，他常说：“我很快乐。”藤田的艺术作品生动地展现了这位精神领袖的个人故事，他至今仍在激励着数百万信众。

“全世界都知道达赖喇嘛是谁，但我们对他的经历又了解多少呢？”藤田说道。

此次展览也是为了纪念达赖喇嘛90岁寿辰——2025年7月6日至2026年7月6日被宣布为“智慧与慈悲年”。在这个具有里程碑意义的一年中，尊者达赖喇嘛将继续传递坚韧、希望以及人人皆有获得幸福之潜力的信念。

🎨 艺术家藤田里马 Rima Fujita

藤田里马 日裔艺术家，出生于东京，曾在纽约生活三十余年，现居南加州，毕业于 Parsons 设计学院。其画作在国际展出，并获得达赖喇嘛尊者、图图大主教及国际和平峰会的认可。她早年在纽约是一名成功的商业艺术家，后在印度和尼泊尔旅行时和一位藏传佛教的高僧对话让她感悟，这位格西对她说：“里马，你必须与他人分享这份喜悦。想想成千上万想来这却无法实现的人，你不能独自承受这份非凡的经历。你必须分享，记住这一点！”

Rima Fujita is a Japanese-born artist who lived in New York for over thirty years and currently resides in Southern California; she is a graduate of Parsons School of Design. Her paintings have been exhibited internationally and have garnered recognition from His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Archbishop Tutu, and the International Peace Summit. In her early career in New York, she was a successful commercial artist; however, during her travels in India and Nepal, a conversation with a high-ranking Tibetan Buddhist master sparked a profound realization. The Geshe said to her, ‘Rima, you must share this joy with others. Think of thousands of people who wish to be here, but cannot. You cannot keep this extraordinary experience to yourself. You must share. Remember that.'

🏛 关于 OUMA

Oglethorpe University Museum of Art 位于美国乔治亚州亚特兰大，是致力于国际与跨文化艺术交流的重要机构。1990 年代曾举办与达赖喇嘛相关的重要展览，尊者亦曾亲临造访。

在尊者 90 岁寿辰之际，这场展览既是致敬，也是一场关于慈悲与良知的当代对话。

欢迎在美东的朋友前往参观与关注！

Atlanta: save the date! To continue celebrating his extraordinary life we are happy to announce this special exhibition at Oglethorpe Museum of Art. This exhibition will be the first time the original artworks from the book, “The Extraordinary Life of H.H.The 14th Dalai Lama,” are presented to the public, and it commemorates the 30th anniversary of HHDL’s visit to Oglethorpe’s exhibition of his personal objects.

The exhibition highlights Fujita’s extensive interviews with the 14th and incumbent Dalai Lama, whose life has been marked by hardship, displacement, and global advocacy for peace. Despite these challenges, His Holiness is known for his optimism and compassion, often remarking, “I am quite happy.” Fujita’s artwork brings to life the personal narrative of a spiritual leader who continues to inspire millions.

“The world knows who the Dalai Lama is, but how much do we know about what he has gone through?” Fujita said.

The exhibition also honors the Dalai Lama’s 90th year — declared the Year of Wisdom and Compassion, spanning July 6, 2025, to July 6, 2026. Throughout this milestone year, His Holiness continues to share messages of resilience, hope, and the belief that “we all have the potential to become happy.”

里玛的许多作品并非以佛教为主题，但她却深深喜爱描绘佛像和神祇。“当我情绪低落时，我常常会画佛像，然后便会感到平静祥和。然而，我的职业道德深深植根于佛教和武士道精神，因为我的祖先是最后的武士。我努力尊重与我共事的人、工作流程和方法。我始终以我的作品为荣。”

里玛与印度有着深厚的渊源，但她与藏族文化、人民和艺术的联系也塑造了她独特的人生轨迹。她成长在一个非宗教家庭，对佛教原本毫无兴趣，直到在纽约遇到几位藏族僧侣，他们向她介绍了藏传佛教。“这彻底改变了我对佛教的看法，”她说。“我在日本生活到15岁，在那里我目睹了佛教界的诸多腐败现象，因此对佛教抱有相当负面的印象。然而，当我接触到藏传佛教后，我发现它更接近佛教的本质，当然，这是总体而言的。”

她开始学习藏传佛教后，梦中经常出现佛像，各种神灵也常常在梦中显现，传达讯息。“我经常梦见达赖喇嘛尊者，这让我感到非常幸福，达兰萨拉是我的精神家园，因为他住在那里。他是我的根本上师。我去过达兰萨拉很多次，每次到那里都感觉像回家一样。回到美国后，我非常想念达兰萨拉，常常为此落泪。达兰萨拉的一切都令我心生敬仰——壮丽的喜马拉雅山脉、清新的空气、寺庙、美好的氛围，还有我亲爱的藏族朋友们。”

作为一名年轻的艺术家，她在纽约的艺术生涯开局非常幸运。二十多岁时，她的作品就已经非常畅销——对于一个刚刚起步的艺术家来说，这无疑是一项了不起的成就。然而，成功背后也隐藏着黑暗的一面。“我当时收入颇丰，但我并不喜欢商业艺术圈。我曾遭到一些知名艺术经纪人的虐待和性骚扰。他们偷窃我的作品，而且我经常拿不到应得的报酬。我目睹了商业艺术行业中如此多的贪婪和欺诈，尽管取得了成功，我却并不快乐。后来，一天晚上，我在梦中听到一个声音说：‘你现在必须帮助西藏！’我意识到，艺术并非最终目标，而只是服务他人的工具；是让世界变得更美好的工具，是为弱势群体发声的工具，是帮助全人类的工具。”

在继续举办展览和出售艺术作品的同时，里玛在发现作品背后的新意义时感到无比自由。她创立了“Books for Children”组织，致力于为藏族难民儿童创作绘本，以帮助他们保护独特的文化和语言。“我已经创作了7本绘本，并向流亡社区捐赠了超过15000册。这些绘本全部是用藏语、英语和日语写成，其中许多还由尊者亲自作序。”她将自己的书籍版税全部捐赠给难民。

“艺术是服务人类的工具，”她坚定地总结道。“我有责任创作艺术，以提高人们对世界重要问题的认识。西藏是我毕生的事业，我会尽我所能继续支持藏人。”

Many of Rima’s works are not Buddhist-themed, but she enjoys painting Buddha and deities deeply. “When I feel low, I often draw Buddha heads, and I begin to feel calm and peaceful. However, my work ethic is strongly based on Buddhism and Bushido, as my ancestors were the last samurais. I try to respect the people I work with, the work process and methods. I keep my pride and honor in what I do.”

Rima and India share a deep bond, but her bond with Tibetan culture, people, and art has also shaped her life in a distinct and unique direction. She grew up in a non-religious family, and had no interest in Buddhism until she encountered several Tibetan monks in New York who introduced her to Tibetan Buddhism. “That completely changed my image of Buddhism,” she said. “In Japan where I lived until I was 15, I had a rather negative image of Buddhism as I witnessed so much corruption in the Buddhist world there. However, when I discovered Tibetan Buddhism it seemed more authentic, generally speaking, of course.”

As she began studying Tibetan Buddhism, she began dreaming about Buddhist images and would often have various deities visit her in my dreams to convey messages. “I feel so happy when I see His Holiness the Dalai Lama in my dreams often, too,” she related to me. “Dharamsala is my spiritual home because he lives there. He is my root guru. I’ve visited Dharamsala many times, and when I arrive there I always feel that I’ve come home. When I return to the USA I miss Dharamsala so much and I often weep. Everything inspires me in Dharamsala—the stunning Himalayan mountains, the crisp air, the monasteries, the beautiful energy, and my dear Tibetan friends.”

She had a very lucky start as a young artist in New York. During her twenties, her art was already selling very well—an incredible achievement for someone who was only just starting out in her career. Yet there was a dark side. “I was making a very good living, but I didn’t like the commercial art world. I was abused and sexually harassed by famous art dealers. They stole my works and often I never got paid for my art that were sold. I witnessed so much greed and dishonesty in the commercial art industry, and I wasn’t happy despite my success. Then, one night, I heard a voice in my dream and it said, ‘You must help Tibet now!’ I realized that art was not a goal, but only a tool to serve others; a tool to make this world a better place, to be the voice for the voiceless, to help humanity.”

While Rima continued to exhibit and sell art, she felt liberated in discovering a new purpose behind her work. She established Books for Children, an organization that creates picture books for the Tibetan refugee children in order to help preserve their unique culture and language. “I’ve made 7 picture books and have donated more than 15,000 books to the community-in-exile. They are all written in Tibetan, English and Japanese, and many of them have forewords written by His Holiness.” She donates her book royalties to refugees.

“Art is a tool to serve humanity,” she concludes with conviction. “It’s my responsibility to create art to raise awareness of important issues in the world. Tibet is my life-time commitment, and I will keep supporting Tibetans in any way I can.”

《欢迎回家》（2017年） 日裔艺术家 藤田里马 想象一位为藏民族自由而牺牲的父亲化作一只仙鹤回到草原，看望他在帐篷里的家人。Japanese-born artist Rima Fujita’s work, “Welcome Home,” depicts a 2017 scene in which Fujita imagined a father who sacrificed his life for the freedom of the Tibetan people returning to the grasslands as a crane to visit his family in their tent.

活动链接原文🔗 Exhibition showcasing the life of the 14th Dalai Lama to open at the Oglethorpe University Museum of Art 奥格尔索普大学艺术博物馆将举办展览，展示第十四世达赖喇嘛的生平

Rima Fujita: Art and Action

The Tibetan blue bear (Ursus arctos pruinosus) is one of the largest carnivores on the Tibet Plateau and is classified as a Category II protected species under Chinese national law.

Human-bear conflicts in Tibet have escalated to unprecedented levels in recent times. From bears congregating at a landfill in Banbar County, Chamdo, to repeated and severe livestock attacks across pastoral areas, and even a series of human casualties, frontline herders have been pushed to the breaking point. Meanwhile, online debates over “protection versus culling” have devolved into bitter, entrenched confrontations.

The surge in human-bear conflict over the past two to three decades is no illusion born of the information age. The author of this article, a native of Nyingchi, Tibet, moves beyond the black-and-white framing of conventional debate to examine the root causes of the Tibetan blue bear crisis. At its core, this is a governance vacuum produced by the collapse of an old order and the failure of a new one to take its place — a structural rupture brought on by modernization. What follows is the author’s analysis of the deep structural forces, lived realities, and political philosophy underlying this human-wildlife conflict.

Introduction

The topic of Tibetan blue bears repeatedly intruding into pastoral areas and triggering human-bear conflicts has generated intense discussion online. Many young Tibetans have been sharing videos and framing the issue in terms of human safety and the fundamental right to survival; others, arguing from a wildlife conservation standpoint, have pushed back just as forcefully.

As someone who grew up in Nyingchi and witnessed human-bear conflict firsthand, I find much of this debate detached from Tibetan reality. I would like to offer some tentative thoughts. What few people seem to ask amid all this argument is the most fundamental question: why have conflicts become so acute in precisely the last two to three decades?

The answer does not lie in the bears themselves. It lies in a deep structural rupture: the dynamic equilibrium between humans and wildlife — sustained over centuries — has been dismantled piece by piece by modernization, while the modern governance systems meant to replace it have yet to establish an equivalent balance. The old world is dead; the new world is not yet born. What follows is an account of this governance vacuum crisis.

The Old Order: A Stable Dynamic Equilibrium Under Spontaneous Governance

Before modernization and modern regulation made their forceful entry into Tibetan pastoral society, a spontaneous order refined over a thousand years maintained a dynamic equilibrium between humans and bears. It rested on four interlocking mechanisms.

The First: The “Boundary Deterrent” of Firearms and Occasional Lethal Force. Traditional herders routinely carried firearms and bladed weapons for self-defense. Shaped by Tibetan Buddhist values, herders did not kill carelessly — but the mere existence of these tools sent a powerful boundary signal. A bear that ventured too close would be driven away or shot. This latent threat of lethal consequence inscribed a behavioral red line into the bear population’s collective memory: humans are dangerous, and crossing the boundary carries a price.

The Second: The “Outer Perimeter” of Domestic Animals. Every household kept large Tibetan Mastiffs whose role was to guard livestock and protect settlements. Packs of these dogs formed the first line of defense around human habitation, significantly raising the cost of any intrusion by blue bears.

The Third: The “Buffer Space” Created by Nomadic Mobility. Traditional nomadic life followed seasonal rhythms; human presence did not accumulate at any fixed location. To bears, humans were a moving presence. The migrations of nomadic communities left room for wildlife to retreat, creating a natural buffer zone between the two.

The Fourth: The “Flexible Constraint” of Indigenous Religious Ethics. The Buddhist precept of non-killing, in its traditional Tibetan context, was not an absolutist animal-rights doctrine but an ethical framework. It discouraged gratuitous killing while recognizing that defensive action taken to protect life and property was not morally equivalent to wrongdoing. This created a space for judgment between “species protection” and “human self-defense.”

The Dismantling of the Old Order Through Modernization

With the full advance of modernization, all four of these mechanisms were broken down. Four transformations stand out.

Transformation One: The Elimination of Lethal Deterrence and the Collapse of Defensive Perimeters. Following the implementation of firearms control policies, herders’ weapons were progressively confiscated, reducing the potential lethal deterrent against blue bears to zero. Bears are highly capable learners; once they discovered that approaching humans no longer posed a danger, this knowledge was passed on across generations. Simultaneously, policies targeting the collection of stray dogs and restrictions on domestic dog ownership caused a sharp decline in the number of dogs in pastoral areas, destroying the defensive perimeter that had once ringed nomadic camps.

Transformation Two: From Nomadic to Sedentary — The Creation of Fixed Foraging Sites As large numbers of herders transitioned from nomadic or semi-nomadic life to permanent settlement, fixed structures, predictable food storage, and consistent waste production turned human settlements into reliable foraging stations that bears could visit repeatedly for stable energy returns.

Transformation Three: From “Private” to “Public” — The End of Community Self-Help As a Category II protected species, the Tibetan blue bear is shielded by absolute legal protection. Social media has made information from remote pastoral areas instantly visible to the outside world, meaning that any act of self-defense by a herder against an attacking bear now risks legal prosecution and moral condemnation from online audiences. The transparency of the information environment has eliminated the space for community self-help, profoundly deepening herders’ sense of powerlessness.

Transformation Four: Tourism Waste and Feeding Behavior Produce Systemic Food Conditioning. The explosion of modern tourism has deposited vast quantities of packaged food waste along roadsides across the plateau. At the same time, large numbers of self-driving tourists actively feed bears in pursuit of viral content. Together, these two factors have produced a catastrophic phenomenon known as food conditioning. Once a blue bear learns to associate human food — obtained from waste dumps or tourists’ hands — with an easy reward, its foraging behavior is irreversibly altered. When it subsequently seeks food from humans and is refused, it escalates to force.

The Cost of Imbalance: Eroded Boundaries and the Testing of Limits

When food-conditioned bears encounter humans constrained by modern legal institutions, the entire ecological equilibrium of the plateau breaks down.

Bears optimize their foraging strategies through trial and error. A first approach to a dwelling, with no gunshot and no barking, teaches the animal that “proximity is safe.” A successful break-in that yields food teaches it that “intrusion is highly rewarding.” Boldness is trained into them through each successive successful incursion. Today, bears face no effective penalty for their escalating behavior, while human self-defense carries legal risk. The result is an inversion of boundaries — it is no longer humans encroaching on wildlife habitat, but bears systematically testing the limits of human space and claiming it as their own.

The Failures of the New Order

In place of the old system, modern institutions offer herders a rigid arrangement: hard legal prohibitions paired with after-the-fact economic compensation. This logic has revealed three fundamental flaws in practice.

Modern Law Eliminates the Spectrum of Graduated Response The law has entirely removed the traditional order’s graduated continuum — from warning and deterrence, to proportional harm, to lethal force as a last resort. Facing a two-hundred-kilogram predator breaking down a door, the legally permissible responses available to herders, such as banging pots or shouting, are simply ineffective against a determined animal.

Compensation Is Reactive and cannot Address Core Fear. Economic compensation is an after-the-fact mechanism. Money may reimburse the market value of a lost animal, but it cannot undo the psychological trauma of daily life under threat, nor address the profound fear for one’s physical safety.

Macro Policy Lacks Local Agency. The components of the old world formed a mutually reinforcing system. Modernization dismantled that system and replaced it with legal prohibitions and compensation procedures for herders — as if asking frontline communities to achieve enormous objectives with minimal resources. It is puzzling that in a governance culture long defined by the principle of “seeking truth from facts,” the responsiveness of the relevant authorities has been so slow. Should officials not be learning from neighboring Qinghai Province — specifically, the community co-management experiments underway in the Sanjiangyuan National Park?

Structural Inequality of Voice and the Transfer of Costs

Stepping back, this situation reveals a profound asymmetry of power and voice: the state is the agent of protection; universities and research institutions are the producers of knowledge; urban publics provide the moral oversight.

Yet the herders — those who have lived here for generations and who possess genuine local knowledge — have been stripped of any meaningful role in decision-making. Netizens thousands of miles away can moralize on social media about herders’ failure to cherish wildlife, precisely because they have never been jolted awake at three in the morning by the sound of a two-hundred-kilogram beast breaking down their door.

Urban residents enjoy the moral gratification of news reports about recovering wildlife populations, while Tibetan herders on the frontlines of survival bear the full, unmediated weight of the real costs and threats to their lives. The long-term benefits of ecological conservation are shared by all of society, while the immediate and devastating costs are borne exclusively by its most vulnerable members. This is not ecological governance — it is a system of cost externalization produced by the unequal distribution of knowledge and power.

Conclusion: Rethinking the “Governance Vacuum” of Modernization

The intensification of human-bear conflict is, on the surface, a clash of values. In substance, it is a symptom of the governance vacuum generated by the forceful imposition of statist modernity.

Rather than stopping at the circulation of emotion and outrage, I hope Tibetan youth will think seriously about these deeper questions. Human-bear conflict is only one symptom of the broader difficulties of Tibet’s modernization: traditional forms of social organization, livelihood practices, and indigenous knowledge systems have been casually labeled “backward” and dismantled in the utilitarian calculus of development, while the modern institutions erected in their place are often blunt and rigid, lacking personnel who combine contemporary expertise with genuine local understanding. The gap through which the Tibetan blue bear now enters the herder’s home is the most visible crack torn open by modernity's rupture of the traditional order.

A truly effective new order requires legal flexibility in grassroots implementation, deep community participation, and genuine respect for the people who live here. We must not approach tradition with the arrogance of those who would sever history without a second thought. Political philosophy has long taught us that modernizations that radically rupture traditional continuities tend to exact high costs — the pursuit of rapid institution-building is not an unqualified good. Governance that endures is governance that respects historical evolution rather than cutting it off: governance that is whole, organic, and natural.

The above represents one person’s view. Comments and criticism are welcome.

原文：洛桑顿珠：藏马熊的问题是一个共性的问题 |论被忽视的藏地新旧秩序的失衡的问题

大河报：夜半叩门的藏马熊：入户夺食、杀畜伤人，人熊冲突何解？

世界日报：藏马熊爱上青藏高原垃圾堆，敲响生态警钟

Author: Lobsang Dondrub

Editor: Ginger Duan

藏马熊（西藏棕熊）是青藏高原体型最大的食肉动物之一，属于中国国家二级保护动物。近期，人熊冲突在西藏前所未有地激化。从昌都边坝县垃圾场多熊聚集觅食，到昌都边坝等牧区频繁发生恶性袭畜事件，甚至接连传出伤人惨剧，导致一线牧民群情激愤。与此同时，网络上关于“保护还是捕杀”的舆论也陷入了针锋相对的隔空论战。

人熊矛盾在近二三十年全面爆发，绝非信息发达带来的错觉。本文原作者作为西藏林芝当地人，跳出非黑即白的传统争论，深入剖析了藏马熊危机的根源——这本质上是一场现代化进程中“旧秩序瓦解、新体系失能”所引发的藏地治理真空。以下是作者对人兽冲突背后深层结构、生存现实与政治哲学的深度思辨。编者对原文结构语言有所改编。

引言

最近，网络上关于藏马熊频繁闯入牧区、引发人熊冲突的话题讨论得轰轰烈烈。许多藏族年轻人纷纷转发视频，将矛盾上升到人的生命安全与生存权高度；而网络上也存在着不少基于野生动物保护立场的针锋相对的观点。

作为一名家乡在林芝长大见过人熊冲突的亲历者，目睹了种种脱离藏地现实的争论，想谈谈自己粗浅的想法。大伙在争论时似乎很少有人追问一个根本问题：为什么冲突偏偏在最近这二三十年间变得如此尖锐？ 答案不在熊患本身，而在于一个深层的结构性断裂：维系了千百年的人与野生动物之间的动态平衡机制，已经在现代化进程中被逐一瓦解；而替代它的现代治理体系，至今未能建立起具备同等效力的新平衡。 旧世界已死，新世界未生，以下是这场“秩序真空”危机的复盘。

旧秩序：自发秩序下稳定的动态平衡

在现代化与现代法规强力进入藏地之前，牧区社会存在着一套延绵千年的“自发秩序”，由四重机制共同构建了人与熊之间的动态平衡：

1. 防身火器与偶发捕杀构建的“边界威慑” 传统牧民普遍持有火枪、刀剑等防身工具。受藏传佛教信仰影响，牧民绝不无端滥杀，但工具的存在本身就是强烈的边界信号。熊若过于逼近就会遭到驱赶或射杀。这种潜在的生存压力在熊的种群记忆中写入了一条行为学红线：人类是危险的，越界要付出代价。

2. 驯养动物构成的“外围防线” 过去每家每户养有体型硕大的藏狗，它们承担着看护牛羊、守卫定居点的职责。成群的藏狗构成了人类聚居区外围的第一道警戒线，极大地提高了棕熊的侵入成本。

3. 游牧流动性带来的“缓冲空间” 传统的游牧生活随季节轮转，人类的痕迹不会在某一个固定地点持续累积。对棕熊来说，人类是流动的存在，游牧部落的迁徙给野生动物留出了退路与缓冲带。

4. 本土宗教伦理的“弹性约束” 藏传佛教的“不杀生”在传统语境中并非极端的动物保护主义，而是一套伦理框架。它倡导不轻杀，但为了保护生命财产而进行的防御反击并不等同于作恶。这在“保护物种”与“人类自卫”之间提供了一个判断空间。

现代化带来的“旧世界”秩序瓦解

现代化浪潮全面推行后，上述四重机制被彻底打破，主要体现在以下四个变革：

1. 致命威慑归零与防御屏障瓦解 火器管控政策实施后，牧民枪支被逐步收缴，人类对棕熊的潜在致命威慑彻底归零。熊具有极强的学习能力，当发现靠近人类不再面临危险，这一经验便代际传递。同时，受流浪犬收容、家犬限养政策影响，牧区犬只锐减，过去守在帐篷周围的警戒防线彻底瓦解。

2. 游牧由“游”转“定”，提供固定觅食站点 随着大量牧民从游牧转为定居或半定居，固定建筑、固定的食物储存和垃圾产出，让聚居区变成了可以被棕熊反复造访、稳定获取能量的“觅食站点”。

3. 防御行为从“私域”变为“公域”，私力救济终结 藏马熊作为国家二级保护动物，受到法律的绝对保护。如今社交媒体让偏远牧区的信息即时透明，牧民面对侵害时的任何自卫反击，都可能面临法律追诉和网络舆论的道德审判。信息透明化消灭了私力救济的空间，极大地强化了牧民的无力感。

4. 现代旅游垃圾与盲目投喂，导致系统性“食物条件化” 现代旅游业的爆发带来了海量的现代食品包装垃圾，在公路沿线堆积。同时，大量自驾游客为了追求流量主动对熊投喂。这两者叠加，导致了灾难性的“食物条件化”（Food Conditioning）。棕熊一旦在垃圾堆和游客手中学会吃人类的熟食，便不可逆地改变了觅食习性。当它主动索取而人类拒绝时，它就会选择用更强势的暴力手段去夺取。

失衡的代价：边界感模糊与试探底线

当“食物条件化”的熊遇上了被“现代制度规训”的人，整个高原生态机制就彻底失灵了。

熊通过“试错—反馈”优化觅食策略。第一次靠近房屋未遇枪声或狗叫，便得知“靠近是安全的”；进一步破坏房屋找到食物，便得知“闯入是有高收益的”。胆量就是这样被一次次成功的侵入“训练”出来的。如今，熊的冒险行为不再承担任何有效惩罚，人的自卫反而伴随着法律风险。这导致了“边界感的倒置”——不再是人类侵入野生动物的领地，而是熊在系统性地试探人类底线，接管人类的生存空间。

新秩序的现实困境与系统缺陷

作为替代，现代制度给一线牧民提供的是一套“法律硬性禁止，经济事后补偿”的硬性安排。这套逻辑在实际运行中暴露出三个根本性缺陷：

1. 现代法律非黑即白，消灭了弹性光谱： 现代法律彻底消灭了传统秩序中从警告、驱赶、适度伤害到极端射杀的灰色缓冲带。面对两百公斤的猛兽砸门，法律允许的合法行为（如敲锅、喊叫）在野兽面前毫无效力。

2. 补偿流于被动，无法解决核心恐惧： 经济补偿是一种“事后机制”。金钱或许能赔偿一头牛的产值，但无法消除牧民日常生活中的创伤与对生命安全的巨大恐惧。

3. 宏观政策缺乏在地性能动性： 旧世界里的组件是一个相互咬合的系统，而现代化拆掉了传统机器，却只递给牧民法律禁令与事后补偿，如同让基层拿着极少的资源去拿下超负荷的宏大标的。令人不解的是，在向来强调“实事求是”的基层治理中，相关部门的能动性为何如此滞后？面对危机，是否应当派人去隔壁的青海省（如三江源国家公园在人兽冲突治理、社区共管上的新尝试）好好学学经？

结构性的话语不对等与成本转嫁

如果把视角拉远，这场宏大叙事暴露出了极其深层的话语权不对等：国家是保护的主体，高校科研机构是知识生产的主体，城市公众是舆论监督的主体。

而世代生活于此、真正拥有地方性知识的牧民，却在决策中被剥夺了发言权。 远在千里之外的网民可以在社交媒体上充满道德优越感地谴责牧民不爱护动物，因为他们从未在凌晨三点被两百公斤的野兽砸门声惊醒。

城市居民享受着“野生动物种群恢复”新闻带来的道德满足，而西藏牧民却在生存第一线独自承受着全部真实代价与生命威胁。 生态保护的远期收益是由全社会共享，而眼前的惨重成本却由最弱势的边缘群体独自承担。这是知识权力不对等所催生的成本转嫁机制，而非真正的生态治理。

结论：反思现代化转型中的“治理真空”

人熊冲突的加剧，表面上是价值观念的冲突，实质上是国家主义现代性强力介入后引发的治理真空症。

我们不能只停留在流量和情绪的宣泄上，我想请广大藏族青年一同思考。人熊冲突只是藏地现代化转型困境的一个缩影：传统的社会组织形式、生计方式和地方性知识体系，在现代化的功利评价中被轻率地贴上“落后”标签并予以瓦解；而替代它们的现代制度，往往粗糙僵硬，且缺乏兼具现代眼光与本土关怀的能动人才。 藏马熊走进牧民家中的那道门缝，正是现代性撕裂传统秩序时，最显性的一道裂痕。

一种真正有效的新秩序，需要法律在基层执行时的柔性与弹性，需要本土社区的深度参与，以及对生存于此的人们的真正尊重。面对传统，我们不能带着盲目斩断历史的蛮横与傲慢。回顾历史，政治哲学早已告诉我们，激进割裂传统的现代化往往付出惨重代价——追求速成制度并非绝对的善。真正具有生命力的善治，往往是那种尊重历史演进、不割裂传统的，“完整的”、“有机的”和“自然的”好。

以上为一家之言，欢迎批评指正。

原文：洛桑顿珠：藏马熊的问题是一个共性的问题 |论被忽视的藏地新旧秩序的失衡的问题

大河报：夜半叩门的藏马熊：入户夺食、杀畜伤人，人熊冲突何解？

世界日报：藏马熊爱上青藏高原垃圾堆，敲响生态警钟

作者：洛桑顿珠

编辑：GD

Exile Tibetan Buddhist nuns carry placards during a protest march demanding the release of their religious leader Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the 11th Panchen Lama, who was put under house arrest by the Chinese authorities this day in 1995 in Tibet, in Dharmsala, India, Wednesday, May 17, 2017. © 2017 AP Photo/Ashwini Bhatia

班禅喇嘛在藏传佛教中有着极其重要的地位。在历史上，达赖喇嘛和班禅喇嘛经常互为师徒，年长者常为年幼者剃度、传法。此外，达赖喇嘛和班禅喇嘛也互为对方寻访和认定转世灵童。因此，班禅喇嘛转世认定从来不仅仅是一项孤立的宗教事务。它关系到藏地宗教传承的延续，以及未来达赖喇嘛转世将由谁以何种方式进行认定的问题。

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The Panchen Lama holds an extremely important position in Tibetan Buddhism. Historically, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama have often served as teacher and disciple to one another, with the elder figure giving monastic vows and teachings to the younger. They have also traditionally played a role in searching for and recognizing each other’s reincarnations. For this reason, the recognition of the Panchen Lama’s reincarnation has never been an isolated religious matter. It concerns the continuity of Tibet’s religious lineage, as well as who will recognize the future reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and by what process.

1995年5月14日，在第十世班禅喇嘛圆寂后的第六年，十四世达赖喇嘛认定6岁的根敦确吉尼玛为第十一世班禅喇嘛。三天后，根敦确吉尼玛和家人在西藏那曲地区嘉黎县的家中被中共当局带走，从此再未公开露面。2015年，中国当局曾回应称，根敦确吉尼玛过着“正常生活”，且“不希望受到任何干扰”，但从未让他本人公开露面，也没有允许外界独立探视。他的下落成为一个持续至今的谜。一些传闻说当初几位班禅喇嘛的候选灵童被中共当局分别送往不同方向，也有人说小班禅（根敦确吉尼玛）在北京，甚至有人声称见过他。中国外交部发言人赵立坚在2020年5月19号表示，他已经完成学龄期义务教育后，通过考试进入大学，有了一份工作。但这些传闻都没有确切证据证实，真相在中共的统治下也不太可能被公开。

On May 14, 1995, six years after the death of the 10th Panchen Lama, the 14th Dalai Lama recognized six-year-old Gedhun Choekyi Nyima as the 11th Panchen Lama. Three days later, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima and his family were taken away by Chinese Communist Party authorities from their home in Lhari County, Nagqu, Tibet. He has not appeared in public since. In 2015, Chinese authorities claimed that Gedhun Choekyi Nyima was living a “normal life” and “did not wish to be disturbed,” but they have never allowed him to appear publicly, nor have they permitted independent outside visits. His whereabouts remain a mystery to this day. Some rumors say that several young candidates for the Panchen Lama’s reincarnation were sent by the CCP authorities in different directions. Others say the young Panchen Lama, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, is in Beijing, and some even claim to have seen him. On May 19, 2020, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said that Gedhun Choekyi Nyima had completed compulsory education, entered university through examinations, and later found employment. But none of these claims or rumors has been independently verified. Under CCP rule, the truth is unlikely to be made public.

另一方面，在达赖喇嘛认定根敦确吉尼玛后，中共迅速否定这一结果，并逮捕、惩处了参与转世寻访和联系工作的恰扎仁波切等人。随后，中共决定采用所谓“金瓶掣签”，重新指定班禅喇嘛人选。1995年11月29日，中共在拉萨大昭寺主持掣签仪式，最终宣布坚赞诺布为中共官方认可的第十一世班禅喇嘛。“金瓶掣签”原本是清朝时期形成的制度，藏人几乎从未实施。但中共后来把它包装为“历史传统”。更严重的问题不在于仪式本身，而在于整个过程已经由政治权力预先控制：达赖喇嘛认定的人选被排除，负责与达赖喇嘛沟通转世事项的高僧被打压、囚禁，参加仪式的人受到警告，中共甚至通过在抽签中作弊的方式以选出早已确定班禅喇嘛的人选。金瓶掣签只是通过一个看似宗教化的仪式宣布中共事先确定的人选而已。

On the other hand, after the Dalai Lama recognized Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the CCP quickly rejected the decision and arrested and punished Chadrel Rinpoche and others involved in the search for the reincarnation and in communicating with the Dalai Lama’s side. The CCP then decided to use the so-called “Golden Urn” drawing to appoint another Panchen Lama. On November 29, 1995, the CCP presided over the drawing at the Jokhang Temple in Lhasa and ultimately announced Gyaincain Norbu as the officially recognized 11th Panchen Lama. The “Golden Urn” system was originally created during the Qing dynasty and was almost never practiced by Tibetans. Yet the CCP later repackaged it as a “historical tradition.” The more serious problem, however, was not the ritual itself, but the fact that the entire process had already been controlled in advance by political power: the candidate recognized by the Dalai Lama was excluded; the senior lama responsible for communicating with the Dalai Lama about the reincarnation was suppressed and imprisoned; participants in the ceremony were warned; and the CCP even cheated during the drawing in order to select the candidate it had already chosen. The Golden Urn drawing was merely a religious-looking ceremony used to announce the CCP’s predetermined candidate.

阿嘉仁波切正是这场仪式的重要亲历者。他曾参与第十一世班禅喇嘛转世相关工作，也亲眼见到中共如何操纵班禅喇嘛的人选。据他回忆，中共就班禅喇嘛转世问题召集高僧大德们进行会议，并提出三点要求：一，指控与达赖喇嘛沟通班禅转世工作的恰扎仁波切为“叛徒”；二，不承认达赖喇嘛认定的根敦确吉尼玛；三，举行金瓶掣签。 他曾建议将达赖喇嘛认定的班禅喇嘛人选也列入候选灵童名单进行掣签，但遭到中共官员严厉拒绝和警告。

Arjia Rinpoche was one of the key eyewitnesses to this ceremony. He had participated in work related to the reincarnation of the 11th Panchen Lama and personally witnessed how the CCP manipulated the selection of the Panchen Lama. According to his recollection, the CCP convened senior lamas and religious figures to discuss the Panchen Lama’s reincarnation and laid out three demands: first, to accuse Chadrel Rinpoche, who had communicated with the Dalai Lama’s side about the Panchen Lama’s reincarnation, of being a “traitor”; second, to refuse to recognize Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, the child recognized by the Dalai Lama; and third, to hold a Golden Urn drawing. Arjia Rinpoche suggested that the Panchen Lama candidate recognized by the Dalai Lama should also be included on the list of candidates for the drawing, but CCP officials harshly rejected his proposal and warned him not to raise it again.

更关键的是，阿嘉仁波切后来回忆，在掣签仪式结束、前往北京的飞机上，官员叶小文（时任国家宗教事务局局长）曾主动向他提到，他们在金瓶中的一支签底部塞了棉花，让其的位置稍微高过瓶口，这样就能抽中中共指定的班禅人选。阿嘉仁波切说，自己听后感到非常害怕，因为这等于听到了官方内部操作的秘密。在此事发生后，1998年，在身居高位的中国佛教协会副会长、中国全国政协常委、青海省政协副主席阿嘉仁波切，青海塔尔寺住持出走美国。这位在中国尊为省部级和尚的活佛，断然放弃了共产党给他的荣华富贵，走上了流亡之路。

More crucially, Arjia Rinpoche later recalled that after the drawing ceremony, on the flight to Beijing, Ye Xiaowen, then director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, voluntarily told him that they had placed cotton at the bottom of one of the slips inside the Golden Urn, making it sit slightly higher than the others. In this way, the slip bearing the CCP’s designated Panchen Lama candidate could be drawn. Arjia Rinpoche said he was terrified when he heard this, because it meant he had learned the secret of an internal official operation. After this incident, in 1998, Arjia Rinpoche—then a high-ranking figure who served as vice president of the Buddhist Association of China, a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), vice chairman of the Qinghai Provincial CPPCC, and abbot of Kumbum Monastery—left for the United States. This tulku, who had been treated in China as a high-ranking “provincial-ministerial level monk,” decisively gave up the status, privileges, and wealth granted to him by the CCP and chose the path of exile.

这也是为什么班禅喇嘛争议至今仍然敏感。它不只是一个失踪儿童的个案，也不只是一次宗教仪式的争议，而是中共试图把藏传佛教最高转世体系纳入其控制。谁控制班禅喇嘛，谁就可能影响未来达赖喇嘛的认定。近年来，中共持续强调宗教“中国化”，并继续公开扶持中共官方班禅坚赞诺布以强化这一政策。2025年在达赖喇嘛尊重90岁寿辰之际，习近平在北京接受了坚赞诺布的“拜见”，他要求中共班禅坚决推进藏传佛教中国化，这也体现了中共希望利用中共官方班禅来控制未来的达赖喇嘛转世认定的险恶用心。

This is why the Panchen Lama controversy remains so sensitive today. It is not only the case of a disappeared child, nor merely a dispute over a religious ceremony. It is part of the CCP’s attempt to bring the highest reincarnation system in Tibetan Buddhism under its control. Whoever controls the Panchen Lama may influence the recognition of the future Dalai Lama. In recent years, the CCP has continued to emphasize the “Sinicization” of religion and has openly supported the CCP-appointed Panchen Lama, Gyaincain Norbu, to reinforce this policy. In 2025, as the Dalai Lama approached his 90th birthday, Xi Jinping received Gyaincain Norbu in Beijing and demanded that the CCP-appointed Panchen Lama firmly advance the Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism. This also reveals the CCP’s sinister intention to use its officially appointed Panchen Lama to control the future recognition of the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation.

如果读者希望了解这段历史的更多细节，可以点击阅读Voice of Tibet (VOT)对阿嘉仁波切的访谈

文： Yuqiao 编辑： Ginger

纪录片《光之子》片长约100分钟。影片采用观察式纪录片的拍摄方法，曾入围 FIRST 青年电影展。故事的主人公是一位名为梅朵嘎布的14岁藏族女孩。她生活在青藏高原的果洛地区的一所孤儿福利学校。在她几个月大时父母离异，而她被母亲带走，之后母亲改嫁随后被外公外婆抚养长大，尽管父母健在但她在情感上成为了“父母双全的孤儿”。

影片最动人的部分，是梅朵内心那份勇敢的本能对亲情的渴望，她的外公外婆的不理解，独自踏上草原深处去寻找家乡是什么，寻找从未谋面的父亲。导演用长时间的跟拍和诗意的镜头拍摄高原环境来间接反映梅朵她的从期待、行动，到面对现实的复杂心路：父亲已组建新家庭，生活有牛羊、有草原，看似幸福，梅朵内心五味杂陈却只能用稚嫩却懂事的语气说，她很高兴爸爸过得很好，只能为父亲有着更好的生活而感到高兴，但其内核仍是一个小女孩在被家庭剥离后的痛苦，只能迎着高原强烈的阳光，用稚嫩的画笔轻轻涂抹出的“家”——爸爸妈妈和她一起笑着，却又那么遥不可及。

而《光之子》超脱于其他美好“故事”的地方，在于它拒绝给出一个简单的答案或廉价的和解。梅朵没有大哭大闹，也没有得到童话般的拥抱，也没有刻意煽情或指责任何人。它以最原生态最克制的方式，展现了一个长期独自生活的孩子的内心世界。

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卡先加导演用纪录片的镜头向世界呈现藏地现代化发展对个体和家庭生活的巨变。父亲那句看似随意的台词——“网络发达，联系越多……离婚对大人们很正常”——点出了当下藏地牧区离婚率上升、传统家庭价值观面临挑战的现实。影片最终指向的，不仅仅是一个女孩寻找父亲的故事，更是时代变迁中无数藏地孩子共同的何以为家的隐痛!

离婚也许是对他们来说是更加好的未来但对许多像梅朵一样的孩子，寄宿在福利学校，被隔代养育其实他们没有和梅朵一样的勇气去说：“我想爸爸妈妈”，他们在成长的历程中只能一个人去体会所有的一切而无法倾诉，只能把所有的思念深埋在心底，在漫长的寄宿生活中慢慢长大。《光之子》像高原的太阳一样照出了这些孩子在心里的伤痕，它提醒我们：无论文化或者社会如何变迁，孩子对父母亲情的渴望，始终是人类最原始也最坚韧的情感之一。

Daughter of the Light is a documentary with a runtime of approximately 100 minutes. Shot in a documentary filmmaking style, the film was shortlisted at the FIRST International Film Festival and received the Audience Choice Honorary Second Prize.

The protagonist of the story is a 14-year-old Tibetan girl named Medok Gabu. She lives in an orphan welfare boarding school in the Golog region of the Tibetan Plateau. Her parents divorced when she was only a few months old. She was taken away by her mother, who later remarried, and was eventually raised by her grandparents. Though both of her parents are still alive, she became, emotionally, “an orphan with living parents.”

The film’s most moving aspect lies in Medok’s instinctive courage and deep longing for familial love. Faced with her grandparents’ lack of understanding, she sets out alone into the vast grasslands to search for the meaning of “home” and to find the father she has never met. Through long-term observational filming and poetic cinematography of the plateau landscape, the director quietly captures Medok’s emotional journey — from hope, to action, to the painful complexity of confronting reality.

Her father has already built a new family. He has livestock, grasslands, and what appears to be a stable and happy life. Medok experiences a swirl of emotions, yet can only respond with the innocent maturity of a child, saying that she is happy her father is doing well. She tries to be glad that he now has a better life. But beneath those words remains the pain of a young girl emotionally separated from her family. Under the harsh sunlight of the plateau, she gently draws the image of “home” with a child’s brushstrokes — herself smiling alongside her mother and father — a dream that feels heartbreakingly distant.

What sets Daughter of the Light apart from many sentimental “feel-good” stories is its refusal to offer easy answers or cheap reconciliation. Medok does not break down in dramatic tears, nor does she receive a fairy-tale embrace. The film avoids forced emotional manipulation and refuses to blame any individual. Instead, in an understated and deeply organic way, it reveals the inner world of a child who has spent years growing up alone.

Through the lens of documentary filmmaking, Khashem Gyal presents to the world the profound transformations that modernization in Tibetan regions has brought to individuals and family life. One seemingly casual line spoken by the father — “With the internet becoming more developed, people stay more connected… divorce is normal for adults now” — quietly points to the rising divorce rates and the challenges facing traditional family values in Tibetan pastoral communities today.

Ultimately, the film is not only about one girl searching for her father. It speaks to the deeper emotional wound shared by countless Tibetan children struggling to understand what “home” means amid rapid social change.

Divorce may indeed lead to a better future for some adults. But for many children like Medok — growing up in boarding welfare schools or being raised by grandparents — they often do not possess the courage to say, “I miss my Mom and Dad.” Throughout their childhood, they are left to process loneliness, longing, and confusion entirely on their own, unable to express what they feel. Their yearning becomes something buried deep inside as they slowly grow up through years of separation and institutional life.

Like the sun shining across the Tibetan Plateau, Daughter of the Light illuminates the hidden emotional scars these children carry. It reminds us that no matter how culture or society changes, a child’s longing for parental love remains one of humanity's most primal and enduring emotions.

Documentary: Daughter of the Light — Trailer
纪录片《光之子》预告片

Producer: Pema Tseden | Directed by: Khashem Gyal
监制：万玛才旦｜导演：卡先加

卡先加 Khashem Gyal

Khashem Gyal（卡先加），来自青海藏区。2013年执导纪录短片《英雄谷》，影片曾入围法国让·鲁什国际电影节，并参展美国现代艺术博物馆当代亚洲影展等多个国际电影节。2017年，其纪录长片《光之子》在东京纪录片提案大会 TokyoDocs 上获得“多彩亚洲奖”。2018年，他入围阿迪斯特金奖（Adeste Gold Medal），该奖项授予全球40岁以下在人文、社会正义、科技、艺术及医学领域作出杰出贡献的青年人物。2019年，其执导的纪录片《勇敢的女孩》获得日本 ATP 大奖。目前，他任教于纽约Columbia University电影系，担任 Adjunct Assistant Professor of Film（电影系客座助理教授）。

Khashem Gyal is a Tibetan filmmaker from Amdo, Qinghai. In 2013, he directed the documentary short Valley of Heroes, which was shortlisted for the Jean Rouch International Film Festival in France and screened at international film festivals, including the Contemporary Asian Film Series at the Museum of Modern Art in New York.

In 2017, his feature documentary Daughter of the Light received the “Colorful Asia Award” at TokyoDocs, the Tokyo International Documentary Film Pitching Forum. In 2018, he was shortlisted for the Adeste Gold Medal, an award recognizing outstanding young individuals under 40 for contributions to the humanities, social justice, technology, the arts, and medicine worldwide.

In 2019, his documentary Brave Girl won the Japanese ATP Award. He is currently an Adjunct Assistant Professor of Film at Columbia University in New York.

导演阐述 Director’s Words

自2016年底，我和我的团队开始了梅朵故事的拍摄，近距离地记录这位幼年就被父母遗弃的女孩的内心世界。童年的创伤在成长的过程一直隐隐作痛，但每一天，她都努力寻找自己的生命方向，走出自己的人生之路。 本电影描述的横亘在子女和父母之间的阴影和障碍无疑也在世界 上不同的角落以不同的方式存在着。我希望这部探索人心的电影，会跨越文化和地域的界限，将思考和希望带给跟父母关系不好的孩子们，也带给那些有一天想要重建与子女关系的父母。 电影命名为《光之子》，寓意是在高原上的藏区孩子们，他们生活在这个地球上离太阳最近的地方，祝福他们会拥有非常光明的前程。

Since the end of 2016, my team and I have been filming Medok’s story, closely documenting the inner world of a young girl abandoned by her parents in early childhood. The wounds of childhood trauma continue to quietly ache throughout the process of growing up, yet each day she struggles to find her own direction in life and carve out her own path forward.

The shadows and emotional barriers between children and parents, as portrayed in this film, undoubtedly take different forms in many corners of the world. I hope this film, which explores the human heart, can transcend cultural and geographical boundaries, bringing reflection and hope to both children who have difficult relationships with their parents and parents who one day may wish to rebuild their relationships with their children.

The film is titled Daughter of the Light because children in the Tibetan regions of the plateau live in one of the places on Earth closest to the sun. The title carries a blessing and hope that they will grow toward bright and radiant futures.

编辑： GD 校对：Yuqiao
文：小光

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以下是部分的放映信息：

纽约 5.14

5.18 UC Boulder

影片海报

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The Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts (TIPA) was originally founded on August 18, 1959, in Kalimpong, India, by the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, shortly after he fled to India following China's suppression of the 1959 Lhasa Uprising. The institution was initially named the “Tibetan Music, Dance, and Drama Society” and was among the earliest organizations established by H.H. the Dalai Lama.

阅读中文

TIPA’s founding was a response by the Tibetan exile community to an urgent cultural crisis — Tibet’s traditional performing arts, including music, dance, and drama, faced an existential threat under Chinese Communist rule. The Dalai Lama instructed his assistants to establish the institution, positioning it as one of the earliest civil society organizations within the Tibetan exile community.

Today, TIPA operates as a semi-autonomous body under the Department of Religion and Culture of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), and is registered as a legal society under the Indian Societies Registration Act.

TIPA currently employs more than 100 performing artists, composers, choreographers, and actors, and stages performances both in India and abroad. As recently as March 2025, a delegation of over a dozen TIPA members traveled to Taiwan to perform.

Dawa Tsering, the Representative of the Central Tibetan Administration in Taiwan, stated: “The Chinese government has changed the public’s perception of Tibetan culture, turning everything into praise for the Communist Party and alienating it from its roots. Tibetans regard traditional song and dance as something extremely important for protecting themselves and passing on their culture. From the very beginning of our exile in India, the first thing we did was implement democratic governance, and then we established monasteries, schools, Tibetan medical centers, and TIPA — all of which are regarded as the most important pillars for preserving Tibetan culture.

TIPA spreads the themes of Tibetan Buddhism — kindness, the elimination of evil, and the pursuit of world peace — and insists on remaining true to its origins. This includes the soaring, melodious chanting once heard in the mountain villages, expressing joy, anger, sorrow, and happiness, as well as costumes and ornaments made from yak and sheep hide. But the Chinese Communist Party’s usual tactic is to label Tibetan traditional dance, religion, and beliefs as superstitious, backward, and ignorant, while claiming that the changes it has brought to Tibet represent so-called civilization, enlightenment, science, and modernization. This is completely at odds with the truth, which is precisely why we must protect our own culture and arts. It is absolutely vital!”

TIPA instructor Sangdan Dhundup explains that the distinctive character of Tibetan dance revolves around themes related to the Dharma and the edification of the human spirit. This includes conveying compassion, how to overcome the Three Poisons of Buddhism — greed, hatred, and delusion (that is, the human weaknesses of “greed,” “resentment,” and “stubbornness”) — as well as celebrating the mountain wind, water, and fire, protecting nature, how parents raise their children, how children show respect to their elders, the impermanence of life, and lyrics in praise of the Dalai Lama.

TIPA’s mission can be summarized in two broad directions. The first is preservation and transmission: Tibet has, since ancient times, been called the “Ocean of Song and Dance” (Glu gar gyi rgya mtsho), and dance and music have always been at the core of Tibetan culture, regarded as an important part of the traditional “Minor Five Sciences” (Rik ne Chungwa Nga). The second is outward dissemination: since its very first performance in Kalimpong in September 1959, TIPA has toured more than 36 countries worldwide, including participation in the 1960 Afro-Asian Conference, attended by 19 nations.

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Major Art Forms

Tibetan Opera (Ache Lhamo)

TIPA carries on the tradition of Tibetan opera (*Ache Lhamo*) — an art form created in central and southern Tibet in the 14th century by the yogi Thangtong Gyalpo. Under the guidance of various masters, the institute has fully preserved the traditional repertoire of three major troupes: Kyormulung, Chungpa, and Monru Ponsang. All professional performers are required to systematically study the Ache Lhamo styles of each school.

Folk Song and Dance

Students undergo rigorous training, systematically studying the traditional folk dances and music of Tibet’s three historic provinces — Ü-Tsang, Dokham (Kham), and Amdo — ensuring that the distinctive artistic styles of each region are preserved in their authentic, original form.

The Shoton Festival and the Tibetan Opera Festival

TIPA hosts the annual 10-day Shoton Festival, attracting audiences from around the world. The Institute also organizes the annual Tibetan Opera Festival (typically held in March or April), featuring performances by approximately 11 opera troupes from India and Nepal.

Arts Education and Talent Development

To date, more than 450 professional graduates have gone out into the world from TIPA. Many serve as dance and music teachers in Tibetan schools and communities across India, Nepal, Bhutan, Europe, and the Americas, becoming cultural ambassadors for the Tibetan exile community.

TIPA currently has more than 100 members, all of whom are Tibetan, drawn from exile communities in India, Nepal, and Bhutan. Anyone with a commitment to preserving Tibetan folk dance and drama may apply, and admission is granted upon passing written examinations and interviews.

TIPA stands as one of the most important institutions for the preservation of Tibetan culture. Successive leaders of the Central Tibetan Administration have held that TIPA not only serves a cultural function — countering the destruction of Tibetan culture, language, and religion under Chinese rule — but also a political one, winning international attention and support for the core issues of the Tibetan people.

In sum, over more than six decades of exile, TIPA has fully preserved Tibetan traditional performing arts and brought them to audiences around the world. It is both a guardian of Tibetan culture and a vital window through which the spirit and character of the Tibetan people are shared with the world.

相关链接🔗

TIPA官方网站

自由亚洲电台：流亡藏人用传统歌舞答谢台湾

Hymn to the Himalayas: Tibetan Music in New York City

文编：GD 校正： Wilson

Read to English

TIPA的创立是藏人流亡社区应对紧迫文化危机的举措——藏人的传统表演艺术（包括音乐、舞蹈和戏剧）在中共的统治下面临存亡威胁。尊者达赖喇嘛指示助手组建了这一机构，将其定位为流亡藏人社区最早的民间组织之一。

目前，TIPA是藏人行政中央（CTA）宗教文化部下属的半自治机构，依据印度《社团注册法》注册为合法社团。

TIPA目前雇用约100多名表演艺术家、作曲家、编舞和演员，在印度及海外举办演出。就在去年，2025年3月TIPA的一行十几人曾赴台湾举办演出。

藏人行政中央驻台代表 达瓦才仁 表示“中国政府改变了公众对藏族文化的认知，将一切都变成了对共产党的赞美，并使其脱离了自身根源。而藏人把传统歌舞视为保护自己、传承文化的非常重要东西，所以我们一开始流亡到印度，第一个实行民主化政治，（然后就是）成立寺院、学校、藏医院、TIPA，这些都会被视为传承藏文化最重要的核心。TIPA传播藏传佛教性善、除恶、追求世界和平等主题，坚持“原汁原味”，包括过去在山里的高亢悠扬吟唱，表达喜怒哀乐，也可见牛羊皮制作的服饰或装饰。但中国共产党惯用手法，是将藏民族传统的舞蹈、宗教、信仰都贴上迷信、落后、愚昧的标签，自称给西藏带来的改变，是所谓文明、开化、科学、世界化。这些与事实背道而驰，所以我们更是要保护自己的文化和艺术，这至关重要！”

TIPA指导老师桑丹敦珠说，藏民族的舞蹈特色环绕在与佛法和教化人心有关主题，包括传达慈悲心，如何驱逐佛教三毒贪嗔痴（也就是所谓的“贪婪”、“怨恨”、“固执”等人性的弱点），还歌颂山风水火，保护自然，父母如何教养孩子，子女怎样尊敬长辈，人生无常和称赞尊者达赖喇嘛等的歌词。

TIPA的使命可概括为两大方向：保护传承： 藏地自古被称为”歌舞之海”（Glu gar gyi rgya mtsho），舞蹈与音乐始终是藏文化的核心，被视为传统“小五明”（Rik ne Chungwa Nga）的重要部分。对外传播： 自1959年9月在噶伦堡完成首场演出以来，TIPA已在全球逾36个国家进行巡演，包括参与1960年有19国出席的亚非会议。

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主要艺术项目

藏戏（阿姐拉姆）

TIPA传承着藏戏（Ache Lhamo）传统——这一艺术形式由14世纪的瑜伽士汤东杰布（Thangtong Gyalpo）在藏地中南部创立。学院在各位大师的指导下，完整保留了觉木隆（Kyormulung）、琼巴（Chungpa）和门孜（Monru Ponsang）三大戏班的传统剧目。所有专业演员必须系统学习各流派藏戏。

民间歌舞

学员接受严格训练，系统学习传统藏地三省的卫藏、多康（康区）和安多三大省区的传统民间舞蹈与音乐，确保原汁原味地传承各地艺术风格。

雪顿节与藏戏节

TIPA每年主办为期10天的雪顿节（Shoton Festival），吸引世界各地的观众。学院还举办年度藏戏节（通常在三四月间），印度和尼泊尔约11个戏班参与演出。

民族艺术教育与人才培养

迄今已有逾450名专业毕业生从TIPA走向世界，许多人在印度、尼泊尔、不丹及欧美各地的藏族学校和社区担任舞蹈与音乐教师，成为流亡藏人社区的文化大使。

TIPA现有100余名成员，均为藏人，他们来自印度、尼泊尔和不丹的藏人流亡社区，任何对传承藏民族舞蹈戏剧有志者，经过考试与面试合格后方可入学。

TIPA则是保存藏文化最重要的机构之一。历届藏人行政中央领导人认为，TIPA不仅在文化上对抗了中国统治下对藏文化、语言和宗教的破坏，也在政治上为藏民族的核心议题赢得了国际社会的关注与支持。

总体而言，TIPA六十余年来，在流亡的艰难处境中，将藏族传统表演艺术完整保存并传播至全球，既是藏文化的守护者，也是对外展示藏民族精神风貌的重要窗口。

TIPA官方网站

自由亚洲电台：流亡藏人用传统歌舞答谢台湾

Hymn to the Himalayas: Tibetan Music in New York City

文编： GD 校正： Wilson

Tashi Delek, I am Ginger Duan, the founder of the Chinese Youth Stand for Tibet.

Last year, I came across a graphic book titled “Voices of the Disappeared.” Through delicate storytelling, it follows a Tibetan woman named Karma, who, after losing her husband at the hands of the CCP police, transforms her personal grief into a pursuit of freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.

The work addresses real issues affecting Tibet and other regions in China, including forced assimilation, cultural erasure, and modern forms of forced labor. Presented in a simple yet powerful illustrated style, it transforms brutality and despair into a vision of a peaceful and free future.

It is, without a doubt, a work prohibited from circulation in China. Yet it is also a rare and gentle graphic narrative that calls attention to the lived realities of oppressed communities.

For perhaps the first time, Tibetans become the main figures in a Chinese-language illustrated work. Their suffering and resilience are portrayed openly and without taboo.

When I first read it, I was deeply moved. The book is not only about Tibetan suffering but also about the remarkable resilience of the Tibetan spirit — the ability to preserve conscience, hope, and imagination even in the most extreme conditions of despair.

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为完成这个项目捐款！

Yet despite its power, I found that this work remains largely unknown in the Chinese-speaking world, and even within human rights communities.

That realization led me to start this project:
The「The Message」Remake Initiative.

🎬 I then began reaching out to the publisher of “Voices of the Disappeared” to inquire whether we could obtain permission to re-create and distribute the work under the Chinese Youth Stand for Tibet initiative.

Fortunately, we were eventually granted authorization.

From there, we began planning the core elements of the remake:

• Re-translating the work into simplified Chinese, with careful adjustments to certain terms based on cultural context

• Producing voice narration for Chinese-speaking audiences

• Adapting the work into an audio-visual format, combining narration and animation

We hope to express the story in a form that better fits contemporary modes of communication, so that these stories can be more widely seen, heard, and understood.

Along the way, we faced a number of practical challenges — including finding suitable Chinese voice actors and navigating cultural and linguistic translation issues. As most of our team consists of young Chinese-speaking volunteers, this process required continuous learning and coordination.

Eventually, we were fortunate to find a middle-aged Tibetan male voice actor who agreed to participate and voice the role of the Dalai Lama. He comes, like the Dalai Lama, from Amdo in eastern Tibet, and speaks Mandarin with a strong Tibetan accent.

He told us that his Mandarin is “not standard.” I replied to him: “You speak very well — it is a perfectly authentic Amdo Tibetan Mandarin. Language does not have a single standard; it has only local voices.”

💡 Why We Are Fundraising

This project is now in the production stage, but we need additional support to complete it. The total production cost is $1,500, and we have raised $300 so far.

We have also received a matching donation pledge of up to $450 from a supporter.

This means that every $1 you donate will be matched dollar-for-dollar, doubling your impact until the match limit is reached. Your support will directly help us unlock the full matching fund and significantly amplify the project’s reach.

The Chinese Youth Stand for Tibet is part of Starshiner, a registered 501(c)(3) non-profit organization in the United States (EIN: 41-2327813).
All donations are tax-deductible under U.S. federal law.

🎧 Where Your Support Goes

Funds raised will be used for:

• Professional voice recording, so the story can truly be heard

• Animation and visual production, to make the narrative more complete and engaging

• Educational and public outreach, bringing these stories into wider discussion spaces

🌱 Our Vision

This is our first official fundraising campaign and an initial attempt to explore how storytelling can preserve memory and amplify silenced voices.

We hope that when people put on headphones or open a screen, they are not just “reading” these stories — but truly hearing them.

If you are able, please support us — and help share this campaign.

Every share may introduce these stories to someone for the first time, especially within Chinese-speaking communities.
Every contribution may help a forgotten voice be remembered by the world again.

Donate in Go Fund Me

为完成这个项目捐款！

Best,
Ginger Duan

The founder of the Chinese Youth Stand for Tibet

扎西德勒，大家好，我是挺藏会的发起人段荆棘。

去年我在网上看到一部名为《无声者的消息》的绘本。它以细腻的叙事，讲述了一位藏族女性 卡玛 在共产党的警察杀死了她的丈夫之后，如何将个人的悲痛转化为对自由，人权和法治社会的追求。作品呈现了发生在藏区和中国各地的关于强制同化、文化清洗与现代强迫劳动等现实议题，并以简洁细腻的漫画风格，将残酷与绝望转化为对未来和平自由化进程的想象。

这无疑是一本禁止在中国传播的作品，却是一部难得的柔软的绘本，它在呼吁外界关注那些被压迫群体的真实处境。藏人几乎是第一次成为一部中文绘本作品的主角，他们的苦难和生命力第一次被毫无禁忌的描绘与呈现。

当我第一次读到它时被深深触动。它不仅是讲述藏人的苦难，更展示了藏人强大的精神韧性：在极端绝望处境中，仍然保有良知与行动的生命力，保持希望和想象力。

Donate in Go Fund Me

为完成这个项目捐款！

但可惜的是，我发现这样一部优秀的作品，在中文世界甚至是整个人权圈子里几乎没有被广泛的传播，所以我决定开始做这个项目：「无声者的消息」重制计划

🎬 我开始尝试联系《无声者的消息》的出品方“Voices of the Disappeared”，询问是否可以获得授权，让我们以华语青年挺藏会的名义进行再创作与传播。

很幸运，我们最终获得了授权。

于是我们开始构想重制要作的几件事：

• 重新进行简体中文翻译，根据文化语境调整部分词语的翻译

• 为华语受众进行语音演绎

• 将作品改编为有声 + 动画的视听版本

• 时代的发展调整部分词语的翻译

希望用更符合当代传播方式的表达，让这些故事能够被更多人真正“看见”。

在这个过程中，我们也遇到了不少现实困难，例如如何找到合适的中文配音演员、如何在文化语境中进行转译等。由于团队成员多为年轻的华语志愿者，这些工作都需要不断学习与协调。

最终，我们也非常幸运地找到了一位中年男性藏族配音演员，他愿意参与其中承担达赖喇嘛的配音工作，他和达赖喇嘛一样，来自东部的安多，他的中文带着浓浓的藏腔，他说他中文讲得不好不标准，我告诉他：你讲得很好，标准的安多汉话，语言没有标准性只有地方性！

💡 为什么发起筹款？

现在，这个项目已经进入制作阶段，但要完成它，我们需要更多支持，我们一共需要1500美元的制作成本，目前已经筹到300元。

同时，我们也获得了一位支持者的配捐承诺（最高 $450）：也就是说，你每捐出 $1，对方也会等额匹配 $1，直到达到上限。你的支持，将直接帮助我们解锁全部配捐，让项目影响力翻倍。

华语青年挺藏会是Starshiner 的一部分，我们是在美国加州注册的 501(c)(3) 非盈利机构（注册EIN编号：41-2327813 ），您给我们的每一份捐款都享受联邦认证的免税资格！

🎧 资金用途

筹集的资金将用于：

• 专业配音录制，让故事真正“被听见”

• 动画与视觉制作，让叙事更加完整

• 教育与公共传播推广，让内容进入更广的讨论空间

🌱 我们的愿景

这是我们第一次发起正式筹款，也是一次尝试。我们希望，当人们戴上耳机、打开屏幕时，不只是“阅读”这些故事，而是真正“听见”它们。

有钱出钱有力出力，请帮助我们转发这条筹款消息吧！

每一次转发，可能让一个人第一次知道这些故事，尤其是要被华人知道。
每一笔支持，都可能让一个曾被忽略的声音重新被世界记住。

Donate in Go Fund Me

为完成这个项目捐款！

以上，华语青年挺藏会发起人 段荆棘

Introduction

Chang Ping (长平) is a well-known Chinese journalist and commentator who once served as deputy editor of Southern Metropolis Weekly, one of China’s most influential liberal media outlets in the 2000s. He became famous for his sharp, independent writing on social justice and freedom of expression. In 2008, after publishing an article about Tibet that urged more open reporting and reflection on ethnic prejudice, he was fiercely attacked by the Chinese nationalists and then banned from publishing in China. Facing continuous censorship and pressure, Chang was eventually forced into exile. Next, let’s revisit Chang Ping’s article and the events surrounding it in the aftermath of the March 2008 protests across Tibetan regions—referred to by the Chinese authorities as the “3·14 incident.”

They have found that Western prejudice against China stems from a sense of cultural superiority. We should then ask: are the Han people guilty of a similar prejudice toward ethnic minorities born of cultural superiority?

Eighteen years ago, on April 6, 2008, shortly after the protests that erupted in Lhasa that March, Chang Ping, then Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Southern Metropolis Weekly, published an article on www.ftchinese.com titled “Tibet: Truth vs. Nationalist Sentiment.” In the piece, he urged the government to lift reporting restrictions on the recent Lhasa riots, encouraged open public discourse, and argued that Han Chinese harbor cultural superiority and prejudice toward ethnic minorities, much like Western societies. His remarks swiftly drew a firestorm of attacks from nationalist netizens, who branded him a “traitor” and “anti-China.”

The online vitriol was soon echoed by state media. Beijing Evening News condemned his views, stating that his “freedom of speech had reached a terrifying level.” This official branding effectively sealed his fate; Chang Ping was promptly removed from his post and reassigned as Chief Researcher at the Southern Metropolis Communication Research Institute. Two years later, the Southern Media Group declined to renew his contract, citing his “trip to India to meet the Dalai Lama” as the reason. Simultaneously, police launched an investigation into him for “colluding with overseas hostile forces to subvert state power.” His name was subsequently scrubbed from the Chinese internet, rendering his body of work unsearchable within the country.

In 2011, Chang Ping left mainland China for Hong Kong, a move that would lead to a permanent separation from his home. After receiving word that he was on a secret arrest list and learning that police had visited his family, he was forced into exile. After traveling through several Southeast Asian countries, he eventually settled in Germany, where he resides today.

Now 57, Chang Ping (born Zhang Ping) grew up during the Cultural Revolution. In 1989, as a sophomore at Sichuan University, he participated in the pro-democracy protests in Chengdu and was briefly detained in the aftermath. Following graduation, he entered journalism and rose to prominence within the “Southern Media Group”—exemplified by Southern Weekly—where he authored acclaimed investigative reports, including “A Review of the Zhang Jun Case.”

"To mitigate the danger of ethnic conflict, start by listening to the voices of Tibetans who have self-immolated," Chang Ping wrote in late 2012. At the time, he was serving as an editor for the Hong Kong-based iSun Affairs. The appeal appeared in his editorial for the magazine’s 35th issue, titled "The Sorrow of Tibet."

Truth vs. Nationalist Sentiment

Chang Ping publish Date: 2008-04-08

Following the unrest in Lhasa, rumors spread rapidly while domestic media remained characteristically silent in China. For several consecutive days, news outlets carried nothing but brief bulletins and statements from officials of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Descriptions of the event were reduced to a single sentence: “Recently, a tiny minority of people in Lhasa engaged in destructive activities involving rioting, smashing, looting, and arson.” This amounted to little more than a headline. However, judging by the severe condemnation of the “Dalai clique” in official remarks, the public sensed the gravity of the situation and naturally sought further details. Drawing on past experience, many turned to overseas media for information. It was at this juncture that posts and videos exposing “fake news” from foreign media began to circulate online. This quickly snowballed into a massive internet campaign by the Chinese public to denounce Western media, leading to the creation of websites such as “Anti-CNN,” “Anti-BBC,” and “Anti-VOA.”

According to materials compiled by netizens, media outlets in countries including Germany, the United States, Britain, and India committed glaring factual errors in their coverage of the Lhasa incident. From a professional journalistic standpoint, some errors were remarkably amateurish, even suggesting deliberate distortion. Although several outlets issued apologies or corrections, the damage caused by the misinformation was already a fait accompli, making it difficult for the Chinese public to move toward reconciliation. As with any false reporting, the primary victim is the credibility of the media itself; ten thousand truths cannot salvage a single lie. In subsequent reporting on this issue, or other major events in the future, if Chinese media remains unable to report freely while overseas media becomes increasingly suspect, where then will the truth be found?

Some netizens exposing these “fake reports” claim their actions are intended to show the world the “truth” of the Lhasa incident. Logically, this claim is flawed; their actions only reveal the truth that Western media reporting was inaccurate. What actually happened in Lhasa? Most Chinese citizens saw only the uniform news released by the government after several days of information blackout. Regarding any monopolized news release from a single source, I would not dare claim it is false, but neither can I confirm it is true. Indeed, most overseas media outlets labeled it “the truth carefully woven by the Chinese government.” Later, when the government organized foreign journalists to visit Tibet, most of their reports remained untranslated in the domestic sphere. Amidst the heat of the anti-Western media wave, even if they had been translated, few would have believed them.

The anger continues to spread. Although the “Anti-CNN” website declared, “We do not oppose the media itself, only unobjective reporting; we do not oppose the Western people, only prejudice,” the reality is not always so nuanced. Many netizens have veered in the opposite direction, or stood there from the start. They do not truly care about journalistic objectivity; they care about the media’s stance. Prejudice is not necessarily unacceptable; it simply depends on which side you favor. If one truly stood for journalistic values, they would not only expose the false reporting of Western media but also question the Chinese government’s dual control over information sources and domestic media. Undoubtedly, the latter causes greater harm to journalistic integrity than the former. As facts have shown, correcting an outlet’s error is relatively easy—a few patient netizens can manage it. However, protesting against state-controlled news means facing state power, leaving the world feeling helpless.

Some Chinese citizens have realized that false reporting and prejudice are not the most frightening threats. As long as there is an open environment for public opinion that allows for full disclosure and discussion, there remains a chance for truth and justice to prevail. This successful counter-strike by netizens against overseas media is a prime example. Overseas Chinese students were the first to identify the issues and react. Their debunking images circulated freely on BBS forums and went viral on famous sites like YouTube. Had these online platforms been restricted, the process of exposure would have faced immense hurdles.

The greatest damage these false reports inflict on journalistic values is that they cause many people to abandon their belief in objectivity and fairness in favor of narrow nationalism. They conclude that “universal values” are merely deceptive tools and that the world is nothing more than a zero-sum struggle for national interest. They even use these errors as justification to claim that lying is “international standard practice,” thereby excusing the lies within their own surroundings or history. Of course, some held these views already; the media incident simply provided them with new evidence to proselytize to others.

However, I also see many Chinese people using this opportunity for broader discussion and deeper reflection. They have found that Western prejudice against China stems from a sense of cultural superiority. We should then ask: are the Han people guilty of a similar prejudice toward ethnic minorities born of cultural superiority? If Western distortions of China stem from a refusal to listen and an obsession with “Orientalist” tropes, as described by Edward Said, then how do we treat our own ethnic minorities? If we use nationalism as a weapon to resist the West, how do we persuade ethnic minorities to abandon nationalism and join the mainstream project of nation-building? The Dalai Lama has asked the government for a re-evaluation of his status; what kind of person is he, truly? Beyond official characterizations, can the media be allowed to discuss this freely to further reveal the truth?

(The author, Chang Ping, is a veteran journalist. He formerly served as the News Director of Southern Weekly and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of The Bund Magazine. He was the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Southern Metropolis Weekly by the time he published this article.)

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“The Rumor-Mongering Freedom of Nandu Chang Ping”

Author: Wen Feng Beijing Daily Online (www.bjd.com.cn)
Date: April 11, 2008

Recently, a person known as “Nandu Changping,” who has been fiercely criticized and denounced by netizens, may once again defend himself in the name of freedom of speech, claiming that online users are trying to deprive him of his right to speak. I usually do not pay much attention to online forums, but this time, due to the intensity of the public backlash, I took a closer look at Changping’s remarks. What I found was that his notion of “freedom of speech” has reached an alarming—even “terrifying”—level.

The core of the statement for which he has been criticized is this: “Freedom of speech naturally includes the freedom to make mistakes, especially the freedom to question power. More frightening than rumors is the deprivation of freedom of speech.” He has even openly labeled this as a universal value. According to this logic, “freedom of speech” would allow one to turn black into white, fabricate facts, distort history at will, speak irresponsibly, and “freely” spread rumors, smear others, and make baseless accusations. This is no different from the hysterical behavior recently displayed by Western media regarding the Tibet issue in China. Is this what freedom of speech means? This is nothing but verbal violence. I have never seen any Western media enjoy such freedom in their own countries, because such “freedom” would infringe upon the rights of others, trample social justice, and abandon even the most basic morality. If this is the “universal value” that Nandu Changping seeks to defend, then it can only be a value devoid of shame.

I did not previously know who Nandu Changping was, but after a brief inquiry, I learned that he is a prominent figure in the Southern Media Group. This is hardly surprising. Newspapers under the Southern Media Group, represented by Southern Weekly, have long prided themselves on being the most “Westernized” publications in China—among the boldest, most insightful, and most profound—and have spared no effort in promoting Western-style “universal values” and “freedom of the press.” It is therefore unsurprising that Changping would hold such views. The reason this incident has caused such a stir is that it comes at a time when Western media are openly fabricating rumors, smearing, and distorting the Tibet issue. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to believe that he or others are merely advocating for “freedom of speech”; it seems they have even cast aside their last fig leaf.

In the eyes of people like Nandu Changping who advocate so-called universal values, anything Western is universal and must be upheld—including the right to spread rumors. This raises an unavoidable question: since modern times, many of the wars and colonial ventures in human history have been initiated by Western countries—where, then, are the “universal values” in these? The existence of people like Nandu Changping and the views they express only demonstrate one thing: those who loudly proclaim and champion “universal values” and “freedom” are merely using them as pretexts to achieve their own ulterior motives. But lies will ultimately remain lies. In the face of facts and truth, the role of lies is only to make people see hypocrisy more clearly, and to ensure that the “universal values” promoted by people like Nandu Chang Ping are rejected by the public.

来源：中国数字时代｜中国猛博之十一： 长平——被围殴后，举起双刃剑

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西藏：真相与民族主义情绪

RFA｜《西藏：真相与民族主义情绪》引起网民批评

翻译：Wilson 编辑文案：Jiangyu 综合编辑：GD

编者按

长平是中国知名记者和评论员，曾任《南方都市周刊》副主编，该刊是2000年代中国最具影响力的自由派媒体之一。他以对社会正义和言论自由的犀利独立评论而闻名。2008年，他发表了一篇关于西藏的文章，呼吁对种族偏见进行更开放的报道和反思，之后遭到中国民族主义者的猛烈攻击，并被禁止在中国出版作品。面对持续不断的审查和压力，长平最终被迫流亡海外。下面，我们来一起回顾2008年3月各地藏区抗暴，被官方所称的314事件后长平所发文章和前后的始末。

18年前，2008年4月6日，在当年3月发生的拉萨抗议活动不久后，时任《南都周刊》副总编辑长平在FT中文网发表了一篇名为《西藏：真相与民族主义情绪》的文章，呼吁政府放开对刚刚发生不久的拉萨事件的报道限制，允许公众开放的讨论，并提出汉人在面对少数民族时，有着同西方社会一样的由文化优越感而导致的偏见。很快，他因此受到持有民族主义观点的网民的大量攻击，称他为“汉奸”和“反华”。

伴随着对长平的网络声讨和谩骂，官方媒体也下场批判，《北京晚报》表示他的“言论自由已到了恐怖的程度”。这成了一种官方的定性，很快，长平遭撤职并调任南都传播研究院任首席研究员，并在两年后被南方报业以“去印度见达赖（喇嘛）”为由不再与之续约，警方也开始以“勾结境外敌对势力颠覆国家政权”对他立案调查。而他的名字也被中国互联网封杀，在国内，搜索他的名字不再能找到任何他的文章。

2011年，长平离开中国前往香港，这成为他和中国内地的永别。在收到自己在一份秘密抓捕的名单上的消息和警察拜访家人之后，他被迫流亡，辗转东南亚几国后，最终在德国定居至今。

现年57岁的长平本名张平，出生于文化大革命时期。1989年，当时在四川大学就读于本科二年级的他在成都参与了抗议活动，并在事件后遭到警方的短暂拘捕。大学毕业后，他进入新闻行业，随后在以《南方周末》为代表的南方系媒体中崭露头角，写作了《张君案检讨》等一系列著名报道。

“要改变民族冲突的危险，请先从倾听藏人自焚者的心声开始。”2012年底，当时在香港《阳光时务周刊》担任编辑的长平，在该杂志第35期《痛哉西藏》中的主编寄语中这样写道。

西藏——真相与民族主义情绪

长平 发表日期：2008-04-08

拉萨事件发生以后，小道消息迅速传开，但是国内媒体照例噤声。连续几天，各家媒体上都只有西藏自治区负责人的简短通报和谈话。通报中，对于事件的描述只有一句：“近日，拉萨极少数人进行打、砸、抢、烧破坏活动。”相当于一个标题新闻。民众从谈话对达赖集团的严厉谴责中，已经知道此事非同小可，自然愿闻其详。依循过去的经验，很多人通过境外媒体来获取更多消息。此时，几个揭露境外媒体虚假报道的帖子和视频却在网上流传开来，很快就酿成了一场中国民众愤怒声讨西方媒体的网络事件，出现了一些命名为“反 CNN”、“反BBC”、“反美国之音”的网站。

根据网民搜集的材料，包括德国、美国、英国和印度在内的一些国家的媒体对拉萨事件的报道中出现了明显的事实错误。从新闻职业规范来看，有些错误非常低级，甚至有刻意误导的嫌疑。尽管有几家媒体进行了道歉和更正，但是失实新闻造成的伤害既成事实，难以得到中国民众的谅解。跟任何虚假新闻一样，这个伤害首先指向媒体自身的公信力，一万个真实也挽救不了一个谎言。在此事的后续报道中，在将来的其他重大事件中，倘或中国媒体同样不能自由报道，而境外媒体又变得面目可疑，那么真相从何处来呢？

一些揭露境外媒体虚假报道的网民宣称，他们要用行动让世人看到拉萨事件的真相。这个说法逻辑不通，因为他们的行动只能让人看见西方媒体报道不实的这个真相。拉萨究竟发生了什么？大多数中国人看到的只有政府在封锁消息几天之后统一发布的新闻。对于任何来源单一的垄断性新闻发布，我不敢说它是假的，但是也不能确认它是真的。事实上，境外媒体大多称之为“中国政府精心编织的真相”。随后政府组织外国记者赴藏采访，他们的报道大多也没有翻译过来。由于声讨西方媒体热浪当头，即便翻译过来也没多少人相信。

愤怒仍在扩散。尽管“反CNN”网站声明，“我们并不反对媒体本身，我们只反对某些媒体的不客观报道；我们并不反对西方人民，但是我们反对偏见”，但事实并非总是如此，很多网民走到了相反的方向，甚至一开始就站在相反的方向：他们并不真的在乎新闻的客观公正，而在乎媒体本身的立场；偏见未必是不能接受的，关键是看你偏向哪一边。如果真的站在新闻价值的立场，那么他们就不会仅仅揭露西方媒体的虚假报道，而且应该质疑中国政府对消息源和国内媒体的双重控制。毫无疑问，后者对新闻价值的伤害更甚于前者。正如已经发生的事实，对个体媒体虚假报道的矫正相对容易，几个耐心细致的中国网民就可以做到；对新闻控制的抗议面对的是国家权力，全世界都徒唤奈何。

一些中国民众已经看到，虚假报道和偏见并不是最可怕的，只要有一个开放的舆论环境，允许充分的揭示和讨论，它们就有走向真相和公义的机会。这次网民对于境外媒体的成功反击，就是一个很好的例子。最早发现问题并及时反应的，是海外的中国留学生。他们制作的揭发图像在BBS上自由流传，也在Youtube这样的著名网站上火热播放。假如这些网络媒体都受到限制，那么揭发进程就会遇到很多困难。

这些虚假报道对新闻价值的最大伤害，在于让很多人进一步放弃了对客观公正的信赖，而选择了狭隘民族主义立场。他们从中得出结论说，普世价值都是骗人的玩意儿，只有国家利益的你争我夺。他们甚至以此为依据说，撒谎也是一种“国际惯例”，从而对自己身边或者历史上的谎言予以谅解。当然，一些人本来就是这样想的，这次媒体事件让他们又找到一个证据，从而去对别人宣讲而已。

但是我也看到，有很多中国人借此机会进行了更广泛的讨论和更深入的思考。他们发现，西方人对中国的偏见，源自一种居高临下的文化优越感。那么应该警惕的是，汉人在面对少数民族时，有没有这样一种由文化优越感而导致的偏见呢？西方人对中国的歪曲报道，源自不愿意倾听和了解，沉迷于萨义德说的那种东方主义想象，那么我们对少数民族又如何呢？如果我们以民族主义为武器来反抗西方，那么怎样说服少数民族放弃民族主义，加入到主流的国家建设中来呢？达赖喇嘛要求政府对他重新评价，那么他到底是一个怎样的人呢？除了官方的定性之外，能不能允许媒体自由讨论以进一步揭示真相？

本文作者长平，资深媒体工作者，曾任《南方周末》新闻部主任，《外滩画报》副总编辑，文章发表时任《南都周刊》副总编辑。

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造谣自由的南都长平

作者：文峰 京报网 www.bjd.com.cn 日期:2008-04-11

近日遭到网友们群起批判喊打的一位叫南都长平的人，可能又要为自己的言论自由辩护了，认为网民们要剥夺他说话的权力。本人对网上的论坛一般不够关注，但这次由于网民们炮火猛烈，对所谓南都长平的言论做了一下了解。一看才知，此人的“言论自由”恐怕不只是到了骇人听闻的程度。而且是到了“恐怖”的程度，此人遭到批判的言论核心是说：“言论自由天然包括说错话的自由，尤其是质疑权力的自由，比谣言更可怕的是对言论自由的剥夺。”而且还公然标榜这是普世价值。按照这个逻辑：“言论自由”就可以颠倒黑白、捏造事实，就可以肆意歪曲历史、可以信口雌黄、可以“自由”地造谣、“自由”地抹黑、“自由”地扣帽子。就如同最近西方媒体在中国西藏问题上歇斯底里的表现一样，这难道就是言论自由吗？这是言论暴力。我从未看到任何一个西方媒体在它的国家里享有这种自由，因为这种自由侵犯了他人的权力，践踏了社会公义、丧失了起码的道德，如果这就是南都长平要维护的“普世价值”，那只能是失去廉耻的价值。

原来并不知道南都长平是何许人，稍做调查，原来此人是南方报系的“当红炸子鸡”：这就不足为奇了，南方报系中以《南方周末》为代表的报纸，一直以来标榜自己是中国最“西化”的报纸，最“大胆”、最有“见地”、最“深刻”，而且对推销西式“普世价值”、“新闻自由”不遗余力。南都长平的这种言论自然毫不奇怪。而这次所以引起如此轩然大波，是由于当下正是西方媒体公然造谣、公然抹黑、公然歪曲西藏事件的时候，这令人不能仅认为他或他们只是想要求“言论自由”，恐怕连自己的最后一块遮羞布都扯下来了。

在一些所谓要求普世价值的南都长平们看来，只要是西方的东西，就是普世的，就是要坚持的，包括造谣的权力，也是需要维护的。这就不禁使人要问，从近代以来，人类历史上所有的殖民和战争都是西方挑起的，这里有什么“普世价值”吗？南都长平这种人和这种言论的存在，只能说明一个事实，就是日下高喊和标榜“普世价值”和“自由”的人，不过是为了达到自己的某种阴暗目的，给自己找一些堂而皇之的借口而已。但谎言终归是谎言，在事实和真相面前，谎言的作用就是使人们对虚伪看得更清楚，使南都长平们宣扬的“普世价值”遭到人们的唾弃。

来源：中国数字时代｜中国猛博之十一： 长平——被围殴后，举起双刃剑

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西藏：真相与民族主义情绪

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编辑文案：Jiangyu 综合编辑：GD

编者按：青海果洛高僧红格尔多吉在越南离奇死去的消息还在海内外藏人群体的震惊中蔓延，而外界华人和外国人似乎还没有搞清楚状况，一个名扬在海内外的高僧由于不配合中共官方指定的汉班禅，被反复骚扰施压，不得不远走越南避难。然而却被越南警方找到，被中共特工跨境镇压，不明不白的死在了越南胡志明。为了大家对红格尔多吉其人有更清晰的了解，也为了纪念他遇害一周年，我们找到并翻译了这篇感人至深的自述，通过红格尔多吉仁波切以朴实而诚挚的语言，文章讲述了他在风雪中成长、弘扬佛法、服务众生的生命旅程，感人至深，与大家分享！

• 相关报道：「红格尔多吉仁波切越南蒙难记」大成就者之殇： 中共跨国追杀时间线全梳理【多图】

English version

我想感谢大家多年来给予我的所有支持，我也想向你们介绍一些有关果洛龙恩寺的情况。藏地被称为世界屋脊。它地广人稀，山清水秀，空气清新，蓝天白云。这里佛法兴盛，佛教徒遍布，寺庙林立，如同夏日繁花。然而另一方面，它又是一个尚未开发且贫困的地区，交通不便，寒风刺骨，天气变化莫测的地区。

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果洛

果洛地区（Golog）是青海省六大自治区之一，位于浩瀚明亮的青海湖以南，是一片神奇的土地。果洛州面积7.7万平方公里，人口约16万，其中藏族人口超过15万。果洛州辖六个县，政治、经济、文化中心为大武。

美丽的阿尼玛卿雪山海拔6282米（20605英尺）。果洛境内山峦叠嶂，有雪山、岩石山峰、森林、牧场覆盖的山地和草原。著名的黄河正是从这里发源，蜿蜒流经果洛。这里河流纵横，大小湖泊星罗棋布。在这样的自然环境中，栖息着高海拔动物：雪狮、雪豹、野牦牛、藏羚羊，以及优雅的鹿群。（放牧）牦牛和绵羊是游牧民族的主要生计来源。

龙恩寺

我的寺院始建于19世纪20年代，由多钦哲耶喜多杰（Do Khyentse Yeshe Dorje， 1800-1866）创建。多钦哲耶喜多杰是十九世纪的一位伟大上师，是仁增晋美林巴（Rigdzin Jigme Lingpa，1792-1798）的转世。起初，寺院只是游牧民用牦牛毛搭建的帐篷，四处迁徙，没有固定住所。在穆斯林军队入侵和中国文化大革命期间，寺院勉强维持。

历代喇嘛凭借非凡的勇气和辛勤的努力，确保了寺院及其传承的延续。尤其是寺院的第九任住持白玛登扎多杰（Terchen Lama Padma Tumtrag Dorjee，1934-2009），也就是人们通常所称的喇嘛桑，他对佛法传承的维护和守护功不可没。1980年，他建造了现在的寺院，这是一座经中国政府正式注册的寺院。

喇嘛桑

为了满足众人的愿望和需求，喇嘛桑克服重重困难，建造了这座寺院。寺院最初只有大约三十名僧人，后来发展到五百名僧人和大约一百名瑜伽士。他建造了雪域的博达那佛塔、桑耶寺的复制品、菩提伽耶的摩诃菩提寺等等。然而，世事无常，喇嘛桑最终离开了人世，去往另一个世界。

喇嘛桑是红格尔多吉的父亲，一个在家修行的瑜伽士，

住持

从2000年起，我遵照喇嘛桑的遗愿，开始负责寺院的各项事务。喇嘛桑圆寂后，这一带的人们都盼望着我能实现他们的愿望，他们眼神里充满希望，双手合十，祈求安康。我不得不承担起这份责任。

成为一座寺庙的住持是许多人的梦想，他们会为此奋斗不息，但我却得偿所愿，被赋予了这份责任。许多人研读佛经，都怀揣着成为大师的秘密愿望，游历各个城市和国家，建造寺庙和道场，广收弟子。然而，在我学习期间，我唯一的目标就是学业进步，没有其他目标。因此，当我突然发现自己肩负起一座大寺庙的重任时，我并不觉得有什么值得庆幸的。

困难

要想当好寺庙的住持，必须学识渊博。很多住持都是高僧大德，学识渊博，戒律严明，心地善良。也有很多住持没有学过，知识浅薄，但凭借着不懈的努力和财富的力量，才获得了现在的地位。我呢，生于艰难的年代，九岁才开始识字。那是一个人人都生活在恐惧之中的年代，不敢学佛，不敢修法，只有在半夜偷偷地学习。那时候，果洛没有学校，更没有寺庙，根本看不到穿着法衣的僧人。

当修行佛法最终被允许时，我认识的许多人都能够重新穿上僧袍，展现出他们的僧侣身份。僧侣群体突然出现，如同绿茵场上铺满鲜花的地毯。在此之前，他们出于需要，一直穿着便服。甚至很少看到有人手上拿着念珠。除了剃光头外，没有任何迹象表明此人是僧侣。然而，那些喇嘛和僧伽内心保持着纯净的佛教修行，凭借他们的慈悲，我们得以从他们那里获得佛法甘露。

至于我，我并没有最好的条件去研习佛法及各种知识。然而，相比那些要么因为时局艰难，要么就是缺乏佛法热情而根本无法研习佛法的喇嘛和僧侣，我仍然认为自己很幸运，因为我受过一些教育，并且对佛法有一定的爱好。

我的佛法传承属于宁玛派的中观、般若波罗蜜、加行、扎龙、大圆满等等，我修习了宁玛派所有生起次第和圆满次第的教法。此外，我还学习了格鲁派等其他传承的见解和修行方法。感觉就像一个视力很好的人，被人用望远镜观察周围的世界。

此外，我还学习了其他国家的语言和文化，这让我有机会了解其他人是如何看待世界的。我结识了世界各地的许多人，并与许多同甘共苦、携手共进的挚友建立了深厚的友谊。

我最后一生的愿望

我觉得我前世一定祈祷过：

“愿我周游世界，用爱与仁慈反复对待每一个人，愿用温柔悦耳的话语造福他们，带给他们平静。”

我的朋友们总是对我很友善，温柔体贴，而我除了传授增进平静与仁慈的方法之外，什么也给不了他们。

童年

我出生在一个普通的游牧家庭，一年四季都跟随牧群，啃食牛肉和牛皮，喝牛奶，吃酸奶。在那个年代，在那样的环境下，甚至连“教育”这个词都闻所未闻。放牧的劳动代代相传，没有学习和动脑的传统。

在我们那边，我家算是大户人家，财产也不少。文化大革命的动乱把我们家彻底吞噬了，只剩下几个人和一点点财产。在那段艰难的岁月里，我母亲承受着巨大的压力，因为她几乎失去了一切，她从未上过学，对追求财富毫无兴趣，现在还要独自抚养五个孩子。我小时候，我们家夏天只能吃酸奶，冬天只能吃糌粑。其他食物我们几乎见不到，因为食物已经变得非常稀缺。我们的肚子总是渴望着面包和米饭的味道，但能吃到酸奶和糌粑就已经非常幸运了。

我大概十一二岁的时候才第一次见到卷心菜和白菜，我的舌头也开始触摸和品尝它们。想到我和儿时伙伴们所经历的种种，我们竟然还能活着，并且能够实现各自的人生目标，真是不可思议。

我从小就没能上学。我的父母和亲戚没能像他们希望的那样，用爱和善意照顾我。我在恐惧和危险的风暴中长大。我为自己没有失去内心的平静和稳定而感到自豪，现在我能够作为一名心灵平静的使者，周游世界。

善心与正念 Good motivation

承蒙父亲的恩德，我不仅拥有了此生，更肩负了这份责任，这无疑是一个利他良机。儿时，聆听菩萨生平的故事，我深受感动。它们如同我心灵中最美味、最滋养的食粮。如果我的心是一只蜜蜂，它将永远在菩萨行的花园里飞舞，永不离去。从小我就决心今生要行菩萨之道。菩提心：慈悲与慈悲，既是我人生的目标，也是我人生旅途中真正的伙伴。

承担责任

喇嘛桑圆寂后，我多次与他的主要弟子们会面，讨论继续维护寺院有何益处，以及不维护寺院有何害处。我们一致认为，应该继续维护寺院，因为这样才能延续喇嘛桑的慈悲。这样，这个庞大的僧团才能继续闻思修行；才能弘扬佛法；才能使与寺院有信仰的人能够获得佛法教诲；才能使修行者获得无尽的利益，等等。

面对困难

喇嘛桑圆寂后的三年间，僧团不断壮大。然而，原有的僧舍年久失修，加上高海拔地区，狂风肆虐，足以摧残地面岩石，更遑论摧残人体。因此，鉴于僧团的修行提升了佛法修持，僧众不得不为僧侣建造新的住所。

建筑材料价格不断上涨，尤其是在中国，因此需要更多资金；这是时代发展的必然要求。佛教寺院绝对应该有经论和证悟的传统，也就是研读和修行，因为它们是寺院的核心。如果没有研读和修行，即使寺院建造了六百英尺高的金塔，也只是空洞的门面。

Chörig Lobling 佛学院

这座寺院的Chöig Lobling佛学院的学生都是品德纯正的僧侣；有勤于闻思教法的学者；也有终生修行、知足常乐、远离欲望的僧侣。学院提供的教育质量一流，每年都有越来越多的学生从安多、藏中和康区前来学习。然而，学院的教学楼和学生设施都很简陋。

寺院设有一个专门修持普巴金刚的闭关中心，每年每位闭关者都会持诵一百万遍金刚萨埵和一百万遍普巴金刚心咒。我们是大圆满教法传承的重要传承者，因此我希望未来能为大圆满修持的各个阶段建立一个高质量的闭关中心。过去，果洛没有尼姑庵，人们看不起受戒的女性。在我看来，我不明白为什么女性，尤其是尼姑庵不受尊重。因此，我创办了果洛第一家尼姑庵。这里戒律严明；尼姑们非常谦逊；她们将戒律视为自己的眼睛。在此基础上，她们拥有越来越多的机会学习佛法和各种知识。

我们制定了完善的计划，以保护喇嘛桑寺原有的部分，该部分用于修持其伏藏法门的密宗修持、按照其教法进行法会和年度竹千法会。我们还为瑜伽修行者找到了老师，并为他们修习佛法和各门知识提供了便利。

红格尔多吉学校

小时候没能上学，我总觉得缺了点什么；只有能给年轻人提供学习的机会，我才会感到满足。为了给年轻人一个更美好的未来，我花了数年时间，创办了一所学习语言、写作和职业技能的学校。学校里的老师们用纯粹的热情和勤奋的付出，为学生们提供了高质量的教育，取得了优异的成绩，这所学校也逐渐成为藏地值得称道的新型学校典范。

在我的家乡，高海拔地区，寒风凛冽，冰雪交加，建造建筑绝非易事。维护已建成的建筑更是难上加难。隆冬时节，高海拔地区的寒风凛冽如同利剑，甚至能亲眼目睹地面裂开、岩石崩裂的景象。然而，这里也拥有令人惊叹的景观，例如亚洲最伟大的佛塔之一——康宗恰隆卡舒尔（雪域博达那佛塔）。要想持续维护这些建筑，使其经久不衰，需要考虑到诸多因素。

坚定不移的信念 The Unshakable Faith

寒风凛冽，冰雪肆虐，万物凋零。然而，凭借着强大的意志力和如金刚般坚定的对佛法的信仰，人们并不畏惧严寒。他们对于佛法的虔诚程度令人难以想象。大地冰雪覆盖，凛冽的寒风卷起大雪，然而人们依然安坐在露天聆听佛法。刺骨的寒意侵入他们的身体，使他们冻得僵硬，最终关节生疮，身体弯曲，手脚扭曲，最终无法正常行走。然而，他们从未被这些苦难吓倒，仍然来到露天聆听佛法。这似乎是藏人，尤其是果洛人的共同特征。

慈悲心 Compassion

传统上，上师会坐在法座上，在一座装饰着鲜艳色彩和鲜花的美丽建筑中避难。虽然我拥有所有这些必要的设施和舒适条件，但前来听我讲法的众多学员却不得不忍受寒冷和生病。这怎么能被忽视呢？我尝试过很多方法来解决这一问题，现在我正在建造一座足够容纳数千名前来参加冬季佛法讲法的学员的讲经堂。

全世界都知道，藏地的发展十分落后。果洛州也同样如此，生活水平仅能勉强维持。尤其是那些对佛法充满信仰的老人，他们为了听闻佛法、绕行佛寺而居住在寺院周围，却很少考虑如何养活自己。寺院周围还有数百名老人，他们一心一意地修行，衣食无忧。

不仅来自周边地区，来自西藏各地的学子和修行者也纷纷来到寺院。这里是佛法的中心，吸引了众多僧尼、老人以及无力自食其力的居士。看到他们饱受饥寒之苦，怎能视而不见？怎能不以慈悲之心看待他们？因此，我每年都会为他们分发食物和衣物。

喇嘛桑年轻时，我们那里的生活十分艰难。他的母亲病倒了，家里没有足够的钱给她买药，最终她去世了。正因如此，喇嘛桑才通过施药帮助人们。他承诺只要力所能及，就分发药品，每年都会向成千上万需要帮助的人分发各种藏药。我以他积极主动、积极进取的精神为榜样，每年都会继续这项美好而富有功德的慈善活动，为众多人分发药品。

冬季静修

这座寺院有着独特的传统，为广大在家众传授各种佛法。多年来，喇嘛桑每年冬天都会为信佛的民众传授各种佛法。他还嘱咐我，不仅要为僧众，也要为在家修行的会众传法。喇嘛桑圆寂三年后，我依然坚持留在藏地，顶着严冬，连续三个月到一百天，为大家详细讲解《普贤上师言教》、《六道中阴教》、《入菩萨行论》等经典。这满足了成千上万人内心深处的渴望，是一种利生清净的行为。同样，我也怀着这种善念，到处弘扬佛法。

传承古老的知识传统

西藏拥有丰富的历史文化，可以造福全世界。传承这一古老的知识传统是每一代人的责任。我们齐心协力，积极行动，致力于保护和弘扬我们的文化。因此，我创立了格萨尔公益基金会、玛域格萨尔文化中心和藏人传统与现代教育学校。

光说不练，真正做起来，关键在于有足够的钱，这是一切事业的基础。我不是世代传承的财富，也不是能让投资翻十倍百倍的商人，也不是把佛法和世俗混为一谈，欺骗世人的政客，也不是利用权势捞取财富的人。我只是被汹涌的变革之海，赤身裸体地抛到岸上的人，就像一个对生意毫无兴趣的乞丐，出身寒门，乞讨为生，是我的宿命。

关于我自己

我所有的钱财，并非父母所赐，更不是骗人的，都是好心朋友送的。我知道，他们的收入，都是他们操劳累、步履维艰、负重前行的汗水换来的。谁能不珍惜这份收入呢？想到他们为挣得这份收入，付出了多少艰辛的体力和心力，我深受感动。我并非无欲无求，对物质财富漠不关心，而是像乞丐一样，得到什么都欣然接受；我并非贪婪，积攒的钱财舍不得用；我并非自私，所得都占为己有。我有责任将所得用于布施和供养。我这么说，并非为了炫耀自己，也并非为了自夸，我只是诚实地讲述自己的真实情况。

我的责任

寺院里现在有七百多名僧尼和瑜伽修行者；学校里有三百名学生；还有三百多名需要照顾的老人。我必须在物质和精神上照顾他们。每年来寺院学习的僧尼人数都在增加；尤其是学校里的学生人数也在增加。此外，还有许多因信仰而与寺院紧密相连的居士。我必须亲自负责寺院及其相关人员的组织、教育和福利。

有信心的人所供养的财物，如果浪费了，或者被别人用了，就会造恶业，就像《百业经》等等说的。因此，我的首要任务是确保捐款得到正确使用，不会丢失或浪费。我衷心地说，任何想要支持和帮助僧伽的人，都应该首先想办法让我知道，这一点非常重要。你们对我充满信心，对我仁慈，为我布施、供养，你们心中充满善念之光，心中充满慈悲之光。我确保我家乡的贫困人民了解你们，了解你们馈赠的价值，看到它，接受它，并从中受益。

在这片高原的寒风雪雨中，我们身心感受到的第一股温暖，来自父母。你们的恩情，也是我们心中永远珍藏的温暖。

你们的笑脸、你们的温柔心灵，倒映在我们心灵清澈的水面上每一朵浪花上。

由红格尔多吉在美国撰写，供所有人阅读。
2012年11月10日。

英文翻译：Peter Alan Robert 博士 中文翻译：麻仁青

仁波切在2012年圣何塞举办的最后一次金刚萨埵禅修及咒语教学期间，等待译员翻译时写下了这段文字。（网站管理员注）

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